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Contract as Empowerment 
Robin Kar† 
This Article offers a novel interpretation of contract law, which I call “con-
tract as empowerment.” On this view, contract law is neither a mere mechanism to 
promote efficiency, as many economists suggest, nor a mere reflection of any famil-
iar moral norm—such as norms of promise keeping, property, or corrective justice. 
Contract law is instead a mechanism of empowerment: it empowers people to use 
legally enforceable promises as tools to influence other people’s actions and thereby 
to meet a broad range of human needs and interests. It also empowers people in a 
special way, which reflects a moral ideal of equal respect for persons. This fact ex-
plains why contract law can produce genuine legal obligations and is not just a 
system of coercion. 
This Article introduces contract as empowerment and argues that it offers a 
theory of contract with distinctive advantages over the alternatives. Contract as 
empowerment is an interpretive theory: it is simultaneously descriptive, explaining 
what contract law is, and normative, explaining what contract law should be. To 
establish the theory’s interpretive credentials, this Article identifies a core set of 
doctrines and puzzles that are particularly well suited to testing competing inter-
pretations of contract law. It argues that contract as empowerment is uniquely ca-
pable of harmonizing this entire constellation of doctrines while explaining the le-
gally obligating force of contracts. Along the way, contract as empowerment offers 
(1) a more penetrating account of the expectation damages remedy than exists in 
the current literature, (2) a more compelling account of the consideration require-
ment, and (3) a concrete framework to determine the appropriate role of certain 
doctrines—like unconscionability—that appear to limit freedom of contract. 
The whole of this explanation is greater than the sum of its parts. Because of its 
harmonizing power, contract as empowerment demonstrates how a broad range of 
seemingly incompatible surface values in modern contract law can work together—
each serving its own distinctive but partial role—to serve a more fundamental 
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principle that is distinctive to contract law. These surface values include the values 
of fidelity, autonomy, liberty, efficiency, fairness, trust, reliance, and assurance. 
Although many people think that contract law must involve trade-offs between 
these values, contract as empowerment suggests that surface tensions between 
them are not always fundamental or real. So long as the complex system of rules 
that govern contracts is fashioned in the right way, these doctrines can work to-
gether to serve a deeper and normatively satisfying principle that is distinctive to 
contract. This framework can therefore be used to guide legal reform and identify 
places in which market regulation is warranted by the principles of contract in 
many different contexts of exchange—from those involving consumer goods to la-
bor, finance, credit, landlord-tenant arrangements, home mortgages, and many 
others. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As Professors Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott have observed: 
“Contract law has neither a complete descriptive theory, explain-
ing what the law is, nor a complete normative theory, explaining 
what the law should be.”1 Contract law superficially reflects a plu-
rality of different values—like those of fidelity, autonomy, liberty, 
 
 1 Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract 
Law, 113 Yale L J 541, 543 (2003). 
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efficiency, fairness, trust, reliance, and assurance.2 This Article 
argues that many of contract law’s deepest tensions can never-
theless be harmonized by reference to a single and normatively 
satisfying principle relating to empowerment. The core idea is 
that contract law aims to empower people to use promises as 
tools to influence one another’s actions and thereby to meet a 
broad range of human needs and interests. I call this view “con-
tract as empowerment.” 
This Article argues that contract as empowerment has in-
terpretive advantages over competing theories of contract. The 
positive argument proceeds in three stages. Part I introduces the 
theory of contract as empowerment and describes its core fea-
tures. Part II highlights one of the central doctrinal challenges 
for modern contract theory. No current theory can jointly ac-
count for three core areas of common-law doctrine: (1) the 
standard remedies in contract law (which focus on expectation 
damages and, to a lesser extent, on specific performance); (2) the 
centrality of the consideration doctrine; and (3) the fairly perva-
sive tension between some doctrines, which invite courts to defer 
to parties’ subjective wills when determining the existence and 
scope of contracts, and certain other doctrines, which invite 
courts to deviate from parties’ subjective intentions to reflect 
concerns for fairness, public policy, and objective intent.3 Part III 
argues that contract as empowerment is uniquely capable of 
harmonizing this entire constellation of doctrines while explain-
ing the legally obligatory force of contracts. 
Along the way, contract as empowerment offers a distinctive 
account of the expectation damages remedy—which significantly 
 
 2 See, for example, id (“Pluralist theories attempt to respond to the difficulty that 
unitary normative theories pose by urging courts to pursue efficiency, fairness, good 
faith, and the protection of individual autonomy.”); Peter Benson, Contract, in Dennis 
Patterson, ed, A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 29, 29 (Wiley-
Blackwell 2d ed 2010) (“[T]he world of contract theory presents itself as a multiplicity of 
mutually exclusive approaches with their own distinctive contents and presupposi-
tions.”); Nathan B. Oman, The Failure of Economic Interpretations of the Law of Contract 
Damages, 64 Wash & Lee L Rev 829, 831 (2007) (“[M]uch of the scholarly discussion of 
contract law implicitly or explicitly assumes that [a coherent normative] interpretation is 
impossible and that the law we have represents, at best, a collection of essentially ran-
dom and disconnected choices resulting from a series of historical accidents.”). 
 3 Professor Peter Benson argues that these three questions are central to contract 
theory. Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in Peter Benson, ed, The Theory of 
Contract Law: New Essays 118, 118–19 (Cambridge 2001). See also Part II. I should note 
that I am, however, offering a slightly expanded description of the third tension in ques-
tion, for reasons that I explain in Part II. Benson also attempts an alternative unifica-
tion of these doctrines. Benson, The Unity of Contract Law at 201–02 (cited in note 3). 
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moralizes the remedy—and suggests that it need not be under-
stood as permitting “efficient breach,” as a number of economists 
have proposed.4 Contract as empowerment offers a novel and 
more compelling account of the consideration requirement than 
exists in the current literature.5 Finally, contract as empower-
ment offers a distinctive understanding of the appropriate role 
of legal doctrines that make the scope or content of contractual 
obligations depend on facts other than parties’ subjective wills.6 
Objective approaches to interpretation provide one example of 
this phenomenon.7 This Article is, however, even more concerned 
with doctrines that either invite or require courts to police con-
tracts for substantive fairness—as reflected in the modern un-
conscionability doctrine8—or on public policy grounds.9 So long 
as these doctrines are fashioned in the right way and with the 
right limitations, contract as empowerment interprets them as 
direct expressions of the basic principles that animate contract 
law and modern market activity rather than as alien intrusions 
into their core subject matter. Part IV, finally, addresses some 
limitations and objections to the theory.  
Contract as empowerment thus offers a fundamental rein-
terpretation of the basic principles that animate contract law 
and modern markets. This interpretation is novel and improves 
on both classical economic and traditional philosophical theories. 
By establishing contract as empowerment’s interpretive creden-
tials with respect to contract law’s doctrinal core, I hope to prove 
 
 4 See Part III.A (offering an empowerment-based account of the expectation dam-
ages remedy, which posits additional remedies as unnecessary for empowerment and 
suggests that moral equals could not reasonably reject a rule that requires contracting 
parties to accept expectation damages and termination of a contract in lieu of perfor-
mance in many circumstances). 
 5 See Part III.B (offering an empowerment-based account of the centrality of the 
consideration doctrine and exposing the link between this account of consideration and 
the standard contract-law remedies); Part III.C (exposing the links between this account 
of consideration, the objective theory of intent, and certain doctrines that invite courts to 
police contracts for fairness). 
 6 See Part III.C (offering empowerment-based accounts of a broad range of doc-
trines that invite or require courts to determine the scope or content of contractual obli-
gations based on factors that go beyond the parties’ subjective wills).  
 7 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201 (1981) (setting forth the modified 
objective approach to contract interpretation). See also generally Joseph M. Perillo, The 
Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69 Fordham L 
Rev 427 (2000). 
 8 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1981) (“Unconscionable Contract or 
Term”); UCC § 2-302 (ALI 2012) (“Unconscionable Contract or Clause”). 
 9 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 178–99 (1981). 
 2016] Contract as Empowerment 763 
 
the usefulness of extending the theory to address a much broad-
er range of doctrinal questions. 
I.  CONTRACT AS EMPOWERMENT: THE BASIC THEORY 
Contract as empowerment begins with a simple observation: 
people sometimes have good reasons to use promises as tools to 
induce other people to make return promises or engage in vari-
ous actions in return. The effectiveness of promises for these 
purposes will typically depend on whether the specific promisees 
trust the specific promisors to fulfill them.10 Interpersonal trust 
of this kind can sometimes be generated in informal ways, but—
especially among relative strangers in many modern settings—
is often lacking absent law.11 When this is the case, contract en-
forcement can therefore empower people to use promises as tools 
to influence one another’s actions and thereby to meet a broad 
range of human needs and interests.12 
This form of empowerment is both personal and interperson-
al. It is personal insofar as it concerns the ability of individual 
people to use promises as tools to meet their personal needs and 
interests. It is interpersonal insofar as it concerns the ability of in-
dividual people to use promises as tools to influence other people’s 
 
 10 See Ernst Fehr and Bettina Rockenbach, Detrimental Effects of Sanctions on 
Human Altruism, 422 Nature 137, 137 (Mar 13, 2003) (“The crucial feature of any ex-
change is that the parties involved have to trust each other.”); Anthony J. Bellia Jr, 
Promises, Trust, and Contract Law, 47 Am J Juris 25, 26 (2002) (“The incentive to rely 
on a promise exists only to the degree that a promise is trustworthy.”). 
 11 See, for example, Simon Deakin, Christel Lane, and Frank Wilkinson, Contract 
Law, Trust Relations, and Incentives for Co-operation: A Comparative Study, in Simon 
Deakin and Jonathan Michie, eds, Contracts, Co-operation, and Competition 105, 122–
23, 125 (Oxford 1997) (suggesting that contract law should be sensitive to the important 
roles that trust and cooperation play in increasing firms’ efficiency). 
 12 In saying this, I do not mean to suggest that it is the legal sanction that must 
always motivate people to respond to contracts. People who have a sense of legal obliga-
tion will often respond directly to the perceived authority of legal rules, along with those 
who have a sense that legal sanctions would be warranted. See Robin Bradley Kar, The 
Deep Structure of Law and Morality, 84 Tex L Rev 877, 880 (2006) (“[W]e are also moti-
vated by a sense of obligation, which is not reducible to instrumental reasoning. . . . This 
sense of obligation gives rise to characteristic patterns in our social lives and structures 
a number of our interpersonal actions and reactions to one another.”). Legal sanctions 
can also provide an assurance of performance for those who are less intrinsically moti-
vated by the law’s authority. As Professor Stewart Macaulay’s famous study, Non-
contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, has shown, even commercial 
entities typically respond directly to perceived rights and obligations that arise from con-
tracts and to equitable concerns that arise within the relationships created by contracts. 
Threats of legal sanction are typically made explicit only rarely and only when these re-
lations break down. Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Prelim-
inary Study, 28 Am Sociological Rev 55, 60–62 (1963).  
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actions. Empowerment should also be understood as a type of 
capability, as Professors Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum 
have defined that term.13 When contractual empowerment ex-
ists, it gives people the freedom and ability to achieve a broad 
range of valuable beings and doings by contracting. 
Empowerment of this kind can prove valuable in a number 
of different contexts, including outside the formal marketplace. 
Consider, for example, the famous case of Hamer v Sidway,14 in 
which an uncle used a legally enforceable promise as a tool to 
induce his nephew to refrain from drinking liquor, using tobacco, 
swearing, and gambling until the nephew turned twenty-one.15 
This was not an arm’s-length transaction in a formal market, 
and the uncle’s motivations in Hamer were apparently at least 
partly altruistic (to help his nephew) rather than purely self-
interested.16 Still, the court held that the promise was an en-
forceable contract, and the availability of legal enforcement 
mechanisms might have helped the uncle generate the trust 
needed to influence his nephew’s actions over such a long period 
of time with this promise.17 If so, then contract law was empow-
ering in the technical sense used here: it enabled the uncle to 
use a legally enforceable promise to influence his nephew’s ac-
tions and thereby to promote a real human need or interest. The 
contract did this even though it did not arise from a typical 
market transaction. 
As important as contractual empowerment can be in some 
nonmarket contexts, it has become especially critical for human 
flourishing in the modern world as modern market activity and 
personal dependence on it have become increasingly robust, 
 
 13 See Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom 18–20 (Knopf 1999); Martha C. 
Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach 17–45 (Belknap 2011). 
 14 27 NE 256 (NY 1891). 
 15 Id at 256. 
 16 See Hamer v Sidway, 11 NYS 182, 184 (NY Sup 1890). 
 17 Of course, one might question whether legal enforceability was needed for trust 
in this particular case, given that the promise arose in a family context. In most intimate 
and family settings, I do not believe that legal enforcement mechanisms are necessary 
for promises to work. See Part III.B (citing this fact as an explanation for why social and 
informal promises are typically not legally enforceable). Still, legal enforcement mecha-
nisms may have been empowering in Hamer because the uncle was trying to induce a 
significant set of actions over an extremely long period of time. Hamer, 27 NE at 257–58. 
When the promise was made, it was not clear that the uncle would even live long enough 
to see his nephew fully perform—in which case the promise might work only if the neph-
ew could trust that he had a legal right against the uncle’s legal estate. This is, in fact, 
how the case ultimately came to court. See id at 256. 
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globalized, and potentially welfare enhancing.18 The ability to de-
pend on a vast network of legally enforceable contracts to obtain 
numerous goods and services from the marketplace has, in fact, 
radically reshaped human life in many parts of the modern 
world.19 It has allowed for much greater division of labor, speciali-
zation, and hence freedom from want for many.20 In addition, peo-
ple who can depend on readily available transactions with others 
to obtain a broad range of goods and services often find themselves 
much freer to develop their own specialized life plans.21 This free-
dom can help them achieve the best lives for them. 
It follows that promisors who seek to use promises as tools 
to influence others’ actions have personal, instrumental reasons 
to favor the promises’ legal enforcement. It is, however, one 
thing to say that people have instrumental reasons to favor con-
tract enforcement and quite another to say that contracts gener-
ate genuine legal obligations. This difference is critical because 
contract law purports to generate genuine obligations and not 
just instrumental reasons for action. Hence, any satisfying theo-
ry of contract should explain this feature of contract law. What 
 
 18 See Joseph Henrich, et al, Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution 
of Fairness and Punishment, 327 Science 1480, 1480 (2010) (noting that evidence sug-
gests that modern prosociality—including large-scale societies in which strangers regu-
larly engage in mutually beneficial transactions—is “not solely the product of an innate 
psychology, but also reflects norms and institutions,” including modern markets and 
world religions, “that have emerged over the course of human history”); Commission on 
Growth and Development, The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and In-
clusive Development 25 (World Bank 2008) (discussing markets as a necessary factor for 
high, sustained economic growth); id at x (“[S]ustained [economic] growth enables and is 
essential for things that people care about: poverty reduction, productive employment, 
education, health, and the opportunity to be creative.”). 
 19 See CGD, The Growth Report at 29 (cited in note 18) (“But in recent decades, 
economists have acquired a deeper appreciation of the underlying institutions that make 
mature markets work. These institutions define property rights, enforce contracts, con-
vey information, and bridge informational gaps between buyers and sellers.”). Going in 
the other direction, Professor Douglass C. North has observed that “the inability of socie-
ties to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most important source 
of both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World.” 
Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance 54 
(Cambridge 1990). 
 20 For a classic discussion, see Adam Smith, 1 An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations 13–30 (Liberty Classics 1981) (R.H. Campbell, A.S. 
Skinner, and W.B. Todd, eds). 
 21 This is a theme that Professor Milton Friedman developed at length in Capital-
ism and Freedom 7–21 (Chicago 1962). This work has become a cornerstone for libertari-
an thinking, but one need not be a libertarian to accept that markets have freedom-
enhancing properties. For a discussion of Friedman’s libertarianism, see Russell G. 
Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue State: Reflections on Public Philosophy, Jurispru-
dence, and Legal Ethics, 75 Fordham L Rev 1339, 1359 (2006). 
 766  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:759 
   
are some of the main differences between instrumental reasons 
and obligations? 
Instrumental reasons are not owed to anyone else, whereas 
obligations are. Obligations give some other person or group the 
authority to demand compliance with a rule or standard.22 Un-
like instrumental reasons, which can always be outweighed by 
other instrumental reasons, obligations have the authority to 
override or exclude some instrumental reasons.23 
Because of facts like these, failures of instrumental rational-
ity typically warrant different reactions than breaches of obliga-
tions. Failures of rationality can invite rational criticism, but no 
one typically has the authority to demand perfect instrumental 
rationality from another person.24 Breach of a contractual obliga-
tion will, by contrast, typically permit not just criticism but also 
private demands for compliance or remediation, backed by the 
coercive power of the state. 
 
 22 Although the term “obligation” can be used in different ways, I believe this re-
quirement is a defining feature of its core meaning. I thus agree with Professor Stephen 
Darwall that “[t]here can be no such thing as moral obligation and wrongdoing”—at least 
in one core, familiar sense—“without the normative standing to demand and hold agents 
accountable for compliance.” Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, 
Respect, and Accountability 99 (Harvard 2006). Although people sometimes use the 
terms “moral wrong” and “moral obligation” to refer to a wider class of phenomena, the 
term “legal obligation” is almost never used so widely. When I ask whether contract laws 
can produce “genuine legal obligations,” I am therefore asking whether they can give 
contracting parties the genuine authority to demand compliance with a contract that is 
backed by the coercive power of the state. 
 23 This point has been made variously, and sometimes with different terminology, 
by many theorists. See, for example, id at 91–118; Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and 
Norms 80–84 (Oxford 1999) (describing legal obligations as generating exclusionary rea-
sons and exclusionary reasons as having a mandatory or required aspect); David O. 
Brink, Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority, and Supremacy, in Garrett Cullity 
and Berys Gaut, eds, Ethics and Practical Reason 255, 259–61 (Clarendon 1997); H.L.A. 
Hart, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham: 
Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory 243, 253 (Clarendon 1982) (describing le-
gal obligations as “peremptory” and tying this to Professor Joseph Raz’s conception of an 
exclusionary reason). 
 24 As Darwall correctly explains, the overriding or exclusionary features of obliga-
tion are only part of their authority, “since there can be requirements on us that no one 
has any standing to require of us.” Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint at 13 (cited 
in note 22). Darwall explains that:  
We are under a requirement of reason, for example, not to believe propositions 
that contradict the logical consequences of known premises. But it is only in 
certain contexts, say, when you and I are trying to work out what to believe to-
gether, that we have any standing to demand that we each reason logically, 
and even here that authority apparently derives from a moral or quasi-moral 
aspect: our having undertaken a common aim. 
Id at 13–14. 
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If contracts are to generate genuine legal obligations, they 
must therefore give contracting parties the authority to demand 
actions from other people. These demands must have some over-
riding or exclusionary force and be legitimately backed by the 
coercive power of the state. No number of instrumental reasons 
can create an overriding authority25 that is legitimately backed 
by the coercive power of the state, and, hence, instrumental rea-
sons cannot explain the legally obligatory force of contracts on 
their own. 
To explain how contracts produce genuine legal obligations, 
one must instead begin with a substantive account of obligation. 
The one I favor is called a “contractualist” account, and it re-
flects one of the two major branches of social contract theory.26 
 
 25 See, for example, id at 14–15: 
There is hence a general difference between there being normative reasons of 
whatever weight or priority for us to do something—its being what we ought to 
or must do—and anyone’s having any authority to claim or demand that we do 
it. If, say, God has the authority to demand that we comply with certain norms, 
his authority to demand this cannot be reduced to any normative reasons that 
the norms might themselves generate or entail, nor, indeed, to his knowledge 
of these. 
It is this fact that leads Raz to propose that law’s authority to generate exclusionary rea-
sons depends on its epistemic capacity to help people identify what they ought to do bet-
ter than they could on their own. Joseph Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality, in Joseph 
Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 210, 214 
(Clarendon rev ed 1994): 
The first two theses articulate what I shall call the service conception of au-
thority. They regard authorities as mediating between people and the right 
reasons which apply to them, so that the authority judges and pronounces 
what they ought to do according to right reason. The people on their part take 
their cue from the authority whose pronouncements replace for them the force 
of the dependent reasons. 
But I agree with Darwall that this account fails to capture the authority of interpersonal 
demands and so cannot be the right account of genuine legal obligations. See Darwall, 
The Second-Person Standpoint at 12 n 25 (cited in note 22) (“In my view, failure to ob-
serve this distinction [between counsel and command] infects Joseph Raz’s account of 
authority.”). 
 26 Speaking at the most general level, social contract theorists seek to account for 
some normative concepts in terms of “principles that are, or would be, the object of a 
suitable agreement between equals.” Stephen Darwall, Introduction, in Stephen 
Darwall, ed, Contractarianism/Contractualism 1, 1 (Blackwell 2003). There are two ma-
jor branches of social contract theory: the “contractarian” and “contractualist” branches. 
“Contractarians take[ ] the [relevant] principles to result from rationally self-interested 
bargaining,” whereas “contractualists” take “the relevant agreement [to be] governed by 
a moral ideal of equal respect, one that would be inconsistent, indeed, with bargaining 
over fundamental terms of association in the way contractarianism proposes.” Id at 4. 
Contractualist theories can, in turn, be specified in a number of different ways. Promi-
nent versions of contractualism can be found in the works of Professors Stephen 
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On the version of contractualism that I endorse, ordinary people 
not only are instrumentally motivated but also have a sense of 
justice and interpersonal obligation.27 This is, in fact, an integral 
part of our evolved moral psychologies, and it animates a com-
plex but highly familiar form of human social life and interac-
tion. I therefore accept the contractualist view that ordinary 
people, who develop in normal social circumstances, typically 
acquire some moral motives that are not merely instrumental. 
But I do not accept this psychological claim on faith. Rather, I 
draw on contemporary developments in evolutionary game theo-
ry and moral psychology to argue for the claim and to better 
characterize the noninstrumental structure of these motives.  
In The Deep Structure of Law and Morality, for example, I 
argue that humans have a natural sense of obligation, which at-
taches most people to shared rules that require self-sacrifice.28 
This feature of human psychology animates a complex and high-
ly structured form of human social life and interaction that can 
be scientifically characterized.29 The human sense of obligation 
 
Darwall, Immanuel Kant, John Rawls, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Thomas Scanlon. 
See id at 5–7. I myself am a contractualist about genuine legal obligations. I differ from 
some other contractualists, however, in that I employ contemporary developments in 
evolutionary game theory and moral psychology to specify the motives and complex 
forms of social life that go into responding to genuine obligations. 
 27 A number of contractualists have suggested that most people have moral motiva-
tions of some kind. See, for example, Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint at 151–81 
(cited in note 22) (describing the psychology of what he calls the “second-person stand-
point” as a feature of human nature that motivates action and that is often responsive to 
the perceived authority of principles and interpersonal demands—not just the desirabil-
ity of outcomes); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 46 (Belknap 1971). On this type of 
view, each person beyond a certain age and possessing the requisite intellectual capacity 
develops a sense of justice under normal social circumstances. In the course of their de-
velopment, ordinary people acquire a skill in judging things to be just and unjust, and in 
supporting these judgments by reasons. Moreover, ordinarily people have some desire to 
act in accord with these pronouncements and expect a similar desire on the part of oth-
ers. Clearly this moral capacity is extraordinarily complex. See T.M. Scanlon, What We 
Owe to Each Other 191–97 (Belknap 1998) (suggesting that ordinary people are motivat-
ed to act not only rationally but also in ways that they can justify to others as conform-
ing to principles for the general regulation of behavior that others, similarly motivated, 
cannot reasonably reject). 
 28 Kar, 84 Tex L Rev at 918–19 (cited in note 12). 
 29 For some examples of this scientific characterization relevant to law, see general-
ly id; John Mikhail, Elements of Moral Cognition: Rawls’ Linguistic Analogy and the 
Cognitive Science of Moral and Legal Judgment (Cambridge 2011); John Mikhail, Uni-
versal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence and the Future, 11 Trends in Cognitive Sci 143 
(2007). See also Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 502–03 (cited in note 27): 
[O]ne might ask how it is that human beings have acquired a nature described 
by these psychological principles. The theory of evolution would suggest that it 
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allows ordinary people to cooperate in groups and to solve a 
broad array of cooperative problems by responding to a shared 
system of perceived obligations30—including contractual obliga-
tions. But this psychology is structured to include not only in-
trinsic motivations to follow rules but also motivations to react 
to deviations in ways that are perceived to be warranted. 
Because of psychological facts like these, it is possible to dis-
tinguish the “reasonable” person from the “merely rational” person. 
Whereas the merely rational person responds solely to instrumen-
tal reasons, the reasonable person has an additional motive: she is 
inclined to seek out and abide by a mutually acceptable set of 
 
is the outcome of natural selection; the capacity for a sense of justice and the 
moral feelings is an adaptation of mankind to its place in nature. 
As it turns out, this form of life is poorly understood as the mere result of individuals 
pursuing outcomes that they take to be personally desirable—no matter how one charac-
terizes people’s individual utility functions. See generally Kar, 84 Tex L Rev 877 (cited in 
note 12). I have argued, instead, that the natural function of the human sense of obliga-
tion (namely, what it was naturally selected for over the course of human evolution and 
prehistory, and therefore what it is particularly well suited to achieve) is to allow people 
to resolve social contract problems flexibly. See id at 878. Because of this fact, the human 
sense of moral and legal obligations has some (admittedly fallible) tendencies to track 
principles that meet a contractualist test. See Robin Bradley Kar, The Two Faces of Mo-
rality: How Evolutionary Theory Can Both Vindicate and Debunk Morality (with a Spe-
cial Nod to the Growing Importance of Law), in James E. Fleming and Sanford Levinson, 
eds, Evolution and Morality 31, 60–65 (NYU 2012) (describing these tracking features of 
the human sense of obligation). But see id at 77–92 (describing some systematic ways 
that these psychological capacities apparently fail to track the right properties and in-
stead generate what I call “moral illusions”). Hence, I accept on empirical grounds that 
ordinary people are motivated to treat some other people as genuine sources of obliga-
tions and to interact with them in ways that exhibit noninstrumental forms of respect.  
 It would be nice if these psychological facts inclined people to treat all humans in 
this way, but our evolutionary history appears to have generated some natural tenden-
cies toward parochialism instead. See Robin Bradley Kar, The Psychological Foundations 
of Human Rights, in Dinah Shelton, ed, The Oxford Handbook of International Human 
Rights Law 104, 129–34 (Oxford 2013). As is evident from both world history and the 
psychological literature on in-group/out-group favoritism, many people are naturally in-
clined to limit this form of respect to perceived in-group members and deny it to some 
perceived out-group members. See, for example, Naoki Masuda, Ingroup Favoritism and 
Intergroup Cooperation under Indirect Reciprocity Based on Group Reputation, 311 J 
Theoretical Bio 8, 9 (2012). I have argued that the law (and especially the recent emer-
gence of international law) can nevertheless promote the extension of these motivations 
to more human beings. See Kar, The Psychological Foundations of Human Rights at 
141–42 (cited in note 29). 
 30 For a detailed description of how this distinctive form of human social life and 
interaction is structured, see Kar, The Psychological Foundations of Human Rights at 
134–40 (cited in note 29). Although that article is focused on how international law can 
promote this form of social interaction among otherwise parochially inclined people, it 
describes the psychology and structure of social interaction among people with a sense of 
interpersonal obligation and how these psychological attitudes work to resolve problems 
of cooperation in great detail. 
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rules for the general regulation of conduct and treat those rules 
as generating genuine obligations, given an appropriate assur-
ance that all others will, too.31 Contractualists hold that these 
perceived obligations are then real when they reflect a system of 
obligations that no one who is similarly motivated could reason-
ably reject in light of the available alternatives.32 If no one can 
 
 31 Here, I am following, but building on, the orthodox way of distinguishing the ra-
tional person from the reasonable person. I define the “perfectly rational” person as 
someone who reasons only and perfectly in accordance with the rules of formal rational-
choice theory—which is fundamentally instrumental in orientation. Perfectly rational per-
sons thus aim to maximize their subjective-preference satisfaction. They accept reasons to 
revise their beliefs about the world but do not accept reasons to revise their preferences—
except to meet certain formal constraints, like those of logical consistency and transitivity. 
Of course, the perfectly rational person does not actually exist. See generally, for example, 
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of 
Choice, 211 Science 453 (1981). See also Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein, and Ted 
O’Donoghue, Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J Econ Lit 
351, 352–55 (2002). I therefore use the term “merely rational” to refer to the less ideal 
counterparts of perfectly rational people. These people often deviate from perfect ration-
ality, either due to limits in rationality or to the reliance on various heuristics or biases. 
Still, these people are thoroughly—if imperfectly—instrumental in their approaches to 
life. For a description of such people, see Russell B. Korobkin and Thomas S. Ulen, Law 
and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 
88 Cal L Rev 1051, 1059 (2000) (“[P]ersons subject to the legal system are seldom ruth-
less optimizers of their utility; rather, they often rely on a range of decision-making 
shortcuts and heuristics.”). 
 The reasonable person is, however, wired differently. She is also inclined to seek out 
and abide by fair and mutually acceptable rules for the general regulation of conduct, 
given an appropriate assurance that all others will, too. For a classic discussion of this 
distinction, see John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: Rational and Full 
Autonomy, 77 J Phil 515, 528–30 (1980) (distinguishing reasonable people from rational 
people). I further build on this orthodox distinction by specifying that the reasonable 
person—at least as I use the term here—treats these rules as generating genuine obliga-
tions. She is thus inclined to engage in a specific and highly structured form of human 
social life and interaction with other people—so long as the governing rules meet a con-
tractualist test and there is sufficient reciprocity.  
 32 This way of articulating the contractualist test was first developed by Scanlon—
although he typically speaks of evaluating “rules for the general regulation of behavior” 
instead of “obligations.” See, for example, T.M. Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarian-
ism, in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds, Utilitarianism and Beyond 103, 110 
(Cambridge 1982) (“An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be 
disallowed by any system of rules for the general regulation of behaviour which no one 
could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.”). I use the 
term “obligation” instead of “rules for the general regulation of behavior” to emphasize 
two points. First, here I am taking the contractualist forms of justification to be especial-
ly appropriate for identifying genuine interpersonal obligations. Second, I believe that, 
when comparing different systems of obligation in this context, one must understand 
how the human psychology of obligation typically functions. The variety of contractual-
ism that I am espousing is thus distinct from some others in the literature.  
 When using contractualist tests to evaluate systems of obligation against the availa-
ble alternatives, one alternative to consider is a system of moral and legal rules that 
permits everything. This would be reflected in a shared view that there are no genuine 
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reasonably reject a system of legal obligations, then the demands 
that arise from this system of obligations and their backing by 
state coercion are justifiable to the particular subjects of the de-
mands and coercion—and on grounds that they themselves cannot 
reasonably reject. Hence, ordinary people have reasons to respond 
to these purported obligations as obligations, and not simply be-
cause of any threats of sanctions or reputational declines. 
Like all accounts of obligation, this one is, of course, contro-
versial.33 I will, however, assume this account for now and re-
turn to questions about its status at the end of the Article. If—as 
I hope to have established by then—contract as empowerment 
plausibly offers the best way to harmonize some of contract law’s 
central tensions, then this account offers—at minimum—one of 
the best and most plausible justifications of contractual obliga-
tions as they currently exist. 
With this background in mind, let us now return to the core 
argument for contract as empowerment. Although contract en-
forcement can instrumentally promote promisors’ empowerment 
interests, empowerment interests can also be cited in a distinct, 
contractualist explanation of why some contracts are genuinely 
legally obligating. To see this, consider a promisor who has 
made a promise in order to influence another person’s actions 
and thereby meet a real human need or interest. If a grant of le-
gal authority to demand compliance is reasonably needed for 
this influence to work, then this promisor cannot both make a 
promise like this and reasonably reject a rule that grants the 
promisee the legal authority to demand compliance. Nor can this 
promisor reasonably reject a rule that permits the promisee to 
invoke the state’s coercive powers in case of noncompliance. This 
 
moral or legal obligations. If, however, everyone were to accept this view, then modern 
human life would be more “nasty, brutish, and short” for everyone involved—as Thomas 
Hobbes famously observed. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 76 (Hackett 1994) (Edwin Curley, 
ed). Hence, in the real world as it exists today, no one can reasonably reject some moral 
and legal principles that prohibit the unbridled pursuit of rational self-interest. Both so-
cial morality and law can give rise to some genuine obligations that limit rationally self-
interested action and can motivate (reasonable) people to act, independently of the 
threat of sanctions.  
 33 For an important argument that this account of obligation applies to obligations 
that have the practical authority that is currently under discussion, see Darwall, The 
Second-Person Standpoint at 300–20 (cited in note 22). For an argument that law pur-
ports to have this practical authority, see generally Robin Bradley Kar, Hart’s Response 
to Exclusive Legal Positivism, 95 Georgetown L J 393 (2007). For an argument that con-
tractualist forms of justification apply to a special domain—namely, to what Scanlon 
calls “what we owe to each other”—see Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other at 191–97 
(cited in note 27). 
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is because a grant of private authority, backed by the coercive 
power of the state, is needed for the promisor to induce the 
promisee to do something of value. 
At least in these circumstances, private contractual de-
mands backed by the coercive power of the state are thus justifi-
able to the particular subjects of the demands in terms of their 
own empowerment interests. If these promises are legally en-
forced, then they are more than just promises: they are also 
genuine legal obligations, because they are governed by a sys-
tem of legal rules that no one can reasonably reject. 
The core idea of contract as empowerment can now be stated 
in simple terms:  
All other things being equal, contract-law rules should be 
set up to empower people to use promises as tools to induce 
others to action and thereby meet a broad range of human 
needs and interests. The law should therefore construe 
promises as generating genuine contractual obligations 
when two basic conditions are met: first, when one party 
makes a promise in order to influence another person’s ac-
tions and thereby promote a real human need or interest; 
and second, when this influence reasonably depends on 
granting the promisee the legal authority to demand com-
pliance. Absent this form of justification,34 the law should 
not enforce promises as true contracts.  
(As with any interpretive theory of contract, this theory thus 
provides not only a justification and explanation of contract law 
but also a way of demarcating the appropriate bounds of what is 
appropriately deemed a “true contract.”) 
In what follows, I say that contract law is “personally em-
powering” when it enforces promises that meet the two criteria 
from the last paragraph and that contract law is “equally em-
powering” when its rules are consistent with the equal personal 
empowerment of all.35 If a set of contract-law rules is personally 
 
 34 I thank Professor Brian Bix for pushing me to clarify this exception in the initial 
statement of the theory. Because contract as empowerment is rooted in a more general 
account of obligation, it does not rule out the possibility of other grounds for the legal 
enforcement of some other classes of promises. Indeed, I outline some of those other rea-
sons elsewhere. See, for example, Part III.B. Contract as empowerment does, however, 
identify a distinctive class of empowerment interests, which can be cited in a special con-
tractualist explanation for why most contract-law rules look the way that they do. 
 35 I would like to thank Professor Dan Markovits for pressing me to clarify these 
different definitions of empowerment and the relations between them. 
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but unequally empowering, and if a more equally empowering 
set is available, then that fact should give some persons prima 
facie reasons to reject the less equally empowering set in favor of 
the more equally empowering one. To produce genuine legal ob-
ligations for all, contract law must therefore be equally empow-
ering, unless deviations from this ideal are ones that no one 
could reasonably reject in light of the available alternatives.36 
Despite its appearance of simplicity, contract as empower-
ment differs from other leading contract theories in ways that 
can have far-reaching implications. For example, unlike contract 
as promise, contract as empowerment does not recommend the 
legal enforcement of the moral obligation to keep one’s promis-
es.37 It focuses instead on a more limited class of promises: those 
that require legal enforcement in order to empower promisors to 
meet a broad range of human needs and interests by influencing 
other people’s actions with legally enforceable promises. As I 
will detail in later sections, contract as empowerment can thus 
explain why social and informal promises are not typically en-
forced,38 why the consideration requirement is so central to con-
tract law,39 and why specific performance is not the typical rem-
edy for breach of contract.40 These features of contract law can 
be hard to explain if one views contract as promise. 
 
 36 This does not mean that contract-law rules must be equally empowering. Consider, 
in this regard, Rawls’s famous argument for the maximin principle, which endorses a prin-
ciple for the regulation of the basic structure of society that endorses certain forms of 
economic inequality so long as these inequalities are part of a system of social coopera-
tion that conduces to the advantage of the least well off. Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 
152–57 (cited in note 27). Rawls’s argument for the maximin principle is a contractualist 
argument, and it suggests that certain inequalities are in fact justifiable to each person. 
In the case of contract law, it is possible that rules that are unequally empowering in 
some ways are still ones that no one could reasonably reject in light of the available al-
ternatives—either because the ideal of equal empowerment is too difficult or costly to 
achieve in practice or because the system of rules provides those who are subject to it 
with advantages that outweigh the inequalities that persist. What is important about 
the contractualist standpoint is, however, the baseline. Deviations from equal empower-
ment must be justified to each person, viewed as free and equal moral agents. On this 
view, the mere fact that a system of rules conduces to the advantage of each is not 
enough to outweigh unequal empowerment unless every alternative set of rules that is 
more equally empowering is even worse for each subject of the inequality. 
 37 For the classic statement of promise-based accounts of contract, see Charles 
Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation 7–27 (Harvard 1981). For 
a more recent and wide-ranging discussion, see generally Symposium, Contract as Prom-
ise at 30: The Future of Contract Theory, 45 Suffolk U L Rev 601 (2012). 
 38 See Part III.B. 
 39 See Part III.B. 
 40 See Part III.A. 
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Unlike contract as promise, contract as empowerment also of-
fers a substantive argument for the legally obligating character of 
this subclass of promises. It therefore avoids the problem of hav-
ing to explain why the morality of promise keeping should be le-
gally enforced when some other aspects of morality (like some 
purportedly immoral acts that do not harm others) should not.41 
Unlike will-based theories of contract, contract as empow-
erment does not begin with a fundamental respect for parties’ 
subjective choices either.42 It is instead concerned with empow-
erment, which is a capability to achieve valuable beings and do-
ings. All other things being equal, contract as empowerment 
therefore recommends giving parties’ subjective choices whatev-
er legal consequences will best promote these capabilities in the 
real world and are most consistent with the equal empowerment 
of all. Sometimes, this will require holding parties to all of and 
only what they have subjectively willed, but at other times—as 
later sections will show—it will require holding them to obliga-
tions that do not perfectly mirror their subjective wills.43 In some 
 
 41 This is an issue because the fact that something is morally obligatory does not gen-
erally mean that it is morally permissible to use state coercion to force moral action. This 
fact can create special problems for normative theories of contract, because contract law 
typically allows expectation damages or specific performance that goes beyond what is 
needed to compensate parties for any harms caused by their reliance. It can therefore ap-
pear that contract remedies violate some moral limitations on the law, such as John Stuart 
Mill’s famous “harm principle”—or the principle that the law should get involved only with 
moral wrongs that generate harms. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in John Stuart Mill, On 
Liberty and Other Writings 1, 13 (Cambridge 1989) (Stefan Collini, ed). For good discus-
sions of these issues, see Stephen A. Smith, Contract Theory 69–78 (Oxford 2004) (ad-
dressing moral objections to promissory theories). See also generally Brian H. Bix, Theo-
ries of Contract Law and Enforcing Promissory Morality: Comments on Charles Fried, 45 
Suffolk U L Rev 719 (2012). 
 42 For a discussion of the will-based theory of contract, see Duncan Kennedy, From 
the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s “Consideration and 
Form”, 100 Colum L Rev 94, 115 (2000) (“The will theory of contract liability states that 
all the rules of law that compose the law of contracts can be developed from the single 
proposition that the law of contract protects the wills of the contracting parties.”); Morris 
R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv L Rev 553, 554–58, 575–78 (1933). The will 
theory was more central to nineteenth-century common-law thought than modern 
thought. See Max Radin, Contract Obligation and the Human Will, 43 Colum L Rev 575, 
575–77 (1943) (discussing the centrality of the will theory to nineteenth-century 
thought). As I explain in Part III.C.1, the importance of the will-based theory to contract 
law is, however, still granted in some form in almost all modern theories of contract. 
 43 See Part III (offering empowerment-based accounts of, among other things, the 
mandatory aspects of contract remedies, the consideration requirement, the implied duty 
of good faith and fair dealing, the various objective approaches to interpretation, and the 
existence of some market regulations). 
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circumstances, the law may even have to limit some people’s 
ability to contract to promote their empowerment.44 
Contract as empowerment can thus explain cases like 
Dougherty v Salt.45 In this case, an aunt used a highly formal-
ized written instrument to promise her nephew money because 
of his past good behavior.46 The aunt clearly intended for her 
promise to be legally enforceable, and one might therefore think 
that its legal enforcement would be “empowering” in one sense 
of this word. But this is not the sense of “empowerment” that I 
am employing here. As I use the term, the aunt did not have any 
genuine empowerment interests at stake in the legal enforce-
ment of her promise, because she was not trying to influence her 
nephew to act in any ways at all—let alone in ways that reason-
ably required legal enforceability of her promise for the influ-
ence to work. She was not seeking to influence the nephew to 
engage in any valuable beings or doings in reliance on a legally 
binding promise. She was merely rewarding him for past ac-
tions, and, hence, there were no empowerment-related grounds 
to treat this instrument as a legally enforceable contract. I 
therefore endorse the court’s holding that this was not a legally 
enforceable contract.47 
For similar reasons, contract as empowerment differs from 
theories that try to reduce contract law to an aspect of proper-
ty.48 Property can often be alienated at will,49 but not all acts of 
alienation seek to influence other people’s actions by means of 
legally enforceable promises. Hence, not all acts of alienation re-
quire legal enforcement to promote either personal or equal em-
powerment as I use those terms. There are, on the other hand, 
other areas of the law that give people legal mechanisms to 
 
 44 See Part III.C.2 (offering empowerment-based accounts of certain limitations on 
freedom of contract that should arise in the fair-lending context). 
 45 125 NE 94 (NY 1919). 
 46 Id at 95. 
 47 The court found that there was no contract because the aunt’s promise lacked 
consideration. Id. 
 48 See Part III.C.2 (offering an empowerment-based account of objective approaches 
to interpretation). 
 49 Professor Stephen Smith calls these theories “transfer” theories because they 
seek to understand contracts as reflecting contemporaneous transfers rather than prom-
ises of transfers in the future. Smith, Contract Theory at 97–99 (cited in note 41) (dis-
cussing transfer theories and some problems they face). For examples of this approach, 
see Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 Colum L Rev 269, 292–94 (1986); 
Benson, Contract at 47–49 (cited in note 2); Peter Benson, The Idea of a Public Basis of 
Justification for Contract, 33 Osgoode Hall L J 273, 300–01 (1995). 
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alienate their property without necessarily seeking to influence 
other people’s actions. Trusts and estates provide good exam-
ples. Trusts and estates can be used to alienate property without 
seeking to influence other people’s actions through a legally en-
forceable promise, and they are therefore properly governed by a 
different set of doctrines than contract law.50 Trusts and estates 
are more highly sensitive to features of the will—as is reflected 
in the terminological distinction between “wills” and “contracts.” 
Finally, unlike contract as reliance, contract as empower-
ment does not seek to interpret contract law by focusing on the 
reliance interests of promisees.51 It focuses instead on the em-
powerment interests of promisors. As I explain later, I believe 
that reliance interests can still generate non-empowerment-
related grounds to permit parties to demand legal compensation 
for certain harms that are caused by reasonable reliance on oth-
ers’ promises.52 Reliance interests can therefore explain the law 
of promissory estoppel but not of contract. The fact that these 
two explanations differ suggests that claims for promissory es-
toppel should be treated differently from claims for breach of 
contract. In fact, contract as empowerment suggests that true 
contracts—that is, promises that are supported by legal consid-
eration—should be treated differently both from promises that 
merely induce detrimental reliance and from unilateral promis-
es of gifts.53 
 
 50 See, for example, Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative 
Transfers §§ 3.1–3.9 (1999) (addressing the execution of wills); Restatement (Third) of 
Trusts §§ 10–16 (2003) (addressing the creation of trusts). 
 51 For classic works that develop aspects of the view that contracts should be un-
derstood to protect promisees’ reliance interests, see generally P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and 
Fall of Freedom of Contract (Clarendon 1979); Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 
(Ohio State 1974); L.L. Fuller and William R. Perdue Jr, The Reliance Interest in Con-
tract Damages: 1, 46 Yale L J 52 (1936). The idea that reliance interests are important to 
contracts goes back even further, however. For example, even before publication of § 90 
of the Restatement (First) of Contracts, some people—like Professor Samuel Williston—
were inclined to view reliance as a substitute for consideration, thus qualifying promises 
as legally enforceable contracts. See Peter Linzer, et al, eds, A Contracts Anthology 339–
49 (Anderson 2d ed 1995) (representing Williston’s comments from the American Law 
Institute debates). 
 52 See Part III.B. 
 53 In saying this, I am using the term “true contract” in a way that differs from 
how the Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines “contract.” The Restatement de-
fines a “contract” as “a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law 
gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a du-
ty.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 1 (1981). This definition is thus broad enough 
to include certain claims that I do not consider claims for true breaches of contract—
for example, many claims for promissory estoppel or covenants. I use a different 
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II.  A CORE CHALLENGE FOR MODERN CONTRACT THEORY 
Having introduced the basic theory of contract as empower-
ment, the remainder of this Article argues that it offers important 
interpretive advantages over other theories of contract—both 
economic and philosophical. To set the stage, this Part begins by 
identifying a core constellation of doctrines, which crystallizes one 
of the central challenges for modern contract theory. I argue 
that this constellation offers an especially probing test for com-
peting interpretations of contract. Part III will then argue that 
contract as empowerment is uniquely capable of harmonizing 
this entire constellation of doctrines while explaining the legally 
obligatory force of contracts. 
When Professors Schwartz and Scott observe that 
“[c]ontract law has neither a complete descriptive theory, ex-
plaining what the law is, nor a complete normative theory, ex-
plaining what the law should be,”54 what precisely is the source 
of the difficulty? Contract law differs in nuance from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction and over different periods of time. These differ-
ences are not the real source of the problem, however, because 
as Professor Benson has recently observed: 
[I]n both the common law and civil law the definitions of 
and mutual connections between the various principles of 
contract law are for the most part well-settled and no longer 
subject to controversy. Indeed, despite differences in formu-
lation, the main elements of the law of contract are striking-
ly similar in both legal systems, and these systems, whether 
directly or by derivation, prevail throughout most of the 
contemporary world.55 
Still, “[t]he same cannot be said [ ] of efforts to understand the 
law at a reflective level.”56 
 
terminology than the Restatement because I believe that the best interpretation of 
these different legal claims shows them to reflect interests that are fundamentally dif-
ferent. It aids the understanding to keep these distinctions clear, rather than viewing 
every legally enforceable promise as a true contract. Indeed, keeping these distinctions 
clear would likely be helpful for courts as well. 
 54 Schwartz and Scott, 113 Yale L J at 543 (cited in note 1). 
 55 Benson, The Unity of Contract Law at 118 (cited in note 3). 
 56 Id. Benson further explains:  
In common law jurisdictions at least, there is at present no generally accept-
ed theory or even family of theories of contract. To the contrary, there exist 
only a multiplicity of competing theoretical approaches, each of which, by its 
very terms, purports to provide a comprehensive yet distinctive understanding 
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Although this problem is general, this Article focuses on 
contract law as it appears in common-law jurisdictions. Given 
the common law’s well-settled doctrinal core, Benson identifies 
three questions that any general theory of contract should ad-
dress in this context: 
[1] The first question asks why expectation damages and 
specific performance, the so-called “normal” contract reme-
dies, should be given for breach of a wholly executory and 
unrelied-upon agreement. [2] The second focuses on the ne-
cessity and the centrality of the doctrine of consideration: 
what might be the rationale for this long-established condi-
tion of contract formation? [3] And the third question asks 
whether contractual liberty, as embodied in the traditional 
principles of contract formation, is compatible with contrac-
tual fairness, as reflected in, say, the more recently devel-
oped doctrine of unconscionability.57 
These combined questions offer an appropriate framework 
for the current analysis for four reasons. First, as later sections 
explain, each of these questions raises independent and well-
known puzzles about the shape of modern contract law.58 These 
puzzles are central enough to the subject matter of contract law 
that some would say they are defining.59 
 
of contract but which, precisely for this reason, is incompatible with the 
others. 
Id. 
 57 Id at 119. 
 58 See, for example, Fried, Contract as Promise at 28–39, 103–09 (cited in note 37) 
(suggesting that the consideration requirement and unconscionability doctrines present 
special problems for the coherence of modern contract law); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, 
The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 Harv L Rev 708, 722–24 (2007) (discussing 
some puzzling features about why the standard expectation damages remedy diverges 
from the morality of promise); Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: 
An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 Yale L J 1261, 1261–64 (1980) (discussing 
the puzzling nature of the consideration requirement and standard remedial rules); 
Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 Yale L J 472, 472–75 
(1980) (addressing the distinctive and potentially puzzling role of substantive fairness 
concerns in contract law). 
 59 See, for example, Benson, The Unity of Contract Law at 153 (cited in note 3) (“No 
doctrine of the common law of contract is more distinctive of it or longer and more con-
tinuously established than the requirement of consideration.”); id at 121 (“The link be-
tween consideration and the availability of the expectation measure is taken to be the 
central and distinguishing feature of contractual liability.”). See also Douglas Baird, Re-
constructing Contracts 3 (Harvard 2013) (noting that “[f]or Holmes, the law of contract 
revolved around three central ideas”—including the consideration requirement, the cen-
trality of the expectation measure of damages, and the various objective approaches to con-
tract formation); id at 5 (suggesting that “[t]he core principles that Holmes put forward [as 
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Second, these combined questions reflect some of the most 
seemingly intractable tensions in modern contract law. Although 
most current theories answer some of these questions, they typi-
cally do so by pointing to some single value that finds regular 
expression in contract law—like the values of fidelity, autonomy, 
liberty, efficiency, fairness, trust, reliance, and assurance.60 Val-
ues like these famously conflict with one another at times, and 
most current contract theories answer some of these three ques-
tions in ways that make it difficult or impossible to answer the 
rest in a satisfying manner. Together, these questions thus crys-
tallize one of the deepest challenges for modern contract theory. 
Third, the doctrinal facts that generate these core questions 
have proved remarkably stable, at least in some form, in all 
common-law jurisdictions with advanced market economies.61 
Within the United States, for example, the standard contractual 
remedies (question 1) and the consideration requirement (ques-
tion 2) have survived influential prophecies concerning the 
death of contract and numerous recommendations for reform by 
leading experts.62 The tension between doctrines that promote 
 
definitive of the core of contract] are still very much with us, but their logic and limits 
are now much better understood,” and organizing the reconstruction of contract law around 
these basic principles and questions); Smith, Contract Theory at 387 (cited in note 41): 
[T]he main reason contract theorists have devoted special attention to reme-
dies is that thinking about remedies raises important theoretical questions. . . . 
[T]he analytic debate about whether contractual obligations are best under-
stood as promises, reliance-based obligations or something else [ ] has been 
conducted, to a significant degree, as a debate about remedies. So too, what was 
earlier described as the normative debate about whether contractual obligations 
are justified on the basis of individual rights or social utility [ ] has frequently al-
so been conducted, particularly in recent years, as a debate about remedies. 
(citation omitted). The claim that doctrines policing bargains for contractual fairness are 
partly definitive of contract law is more controversial. But as I argue in Part III.C.2, his-
tory suggests that the actual rules governing contractual exchanges have typically re-
flected some blend of commitments to contractual freedom and fair exchange. It is thus 
better to consider this feature of contract law as part of the relevant explanandum. 
 60 See Part III.B. 
 61 See Benson, The Unity of Contract at 153 (cited in note 3). 
 62 With respect to the consideration requirement, Professor Grant Gilmore prophe-
sized its demise. Gilmore, The Death of Contract at 76–81 (cited in note 51). Professor 
Charles Fried has argued for its abolishment. Fried, Contract as Promise at 28–39 (cited in 
note 37). In 1981, Professor Charles L. Knapp noted that promissory estoppel, which elimi-
nates the consideration requirement and allows for reliance damages, had “become perhaps 
the most radical and expansive development of this century in the law of promissory liabil-
ity.” Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promisso-
ry Estoppel, 81 Colum L Rev 52, 53 (1981). Yet in a review of these developments almost 
two decades later, Knapp suggested that a “reassessment appear[ed] to be in order” and 
that “1980 may have been the high-water mark for promissory estoppel.” Charles L. 
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contractual liberty and those that promote contractual fairness 
(question 3) has played itself out in more-diverse ways. Still, de-
spite a long history of divisive debate over how this tension 
should be resolved, the tension has persisted in some form in all 
common-law systems with advanced market economies.63 All 
other things being equal, a general interpretation of contract 
law that harmonizes this entire constellation of doctrines, and 
does so in terms of a single normatively satisfying principle, 
should therefore be preferred over the alternatives. 
Fourth, many of the doctrines that give rise to these core 
questions reflect mandatory rules. Mandatory rules are rules 
that parties cannot freely contract around, whereas default rules 
are ones that parties can.64 Mandatory rules present special 
challenges to many theories of contract because they appear to 
conflict with basic principles of freedom of contract.65 
When it comes to contract remedies, parties can, for exam-
ple, insert liquidated damages clauses into their contracts and 
thereby try to specify the damages that will ensue from a 
breach.66 Courts will not defer to these clauses, however, if they 
are deemed “punitive” in the sense that they exceed a reasona-
ble estimation of the compensation needed to protect parties’ 
 
Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 Hastings L J 1191, 1192 
(1998). As for the standard contractual remedies, some theorists like Professor Seana 
Shiffrin have argued on moral grounds that specific performance may be a more appro-
priate remedy than expectation damages. Shiffrin, 120 Harv L Rev at 722–24 (cited in 
note 58). Nonetheless, the standard remedy for breach of contract is still expectation 
damages. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347 (1981) (defining the general 
measure of damages as the loss in value caused by breach, plus any incidental and con-
sequential losses, less any costs and losses that were avoided). 
 63 See, for example, Kronman, 89 Yale L J at 473 (cited in note 58) (“There are, in 
fact, many rules of contract law that are deliberately intended to promote a distributional 
end of some sort.”); Elizabeth Anderson, Toward a Post Cold-War Political Economy 
(Left2Right, Jan 9, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/F7XA-X6K8 (describing these ten-
sions as integral parts of advanced capital market economies and noting that we therefore 
“tend to think that the economies of the advanced democracies in North America and 
Europe are ‘mixed’ in some kind of combination of laissez-faire capitalism and socialism”). 
 64 See, for example, Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering 
Rules, 121 Yale L J 2032, 2035 (2012) (defining mandatory and default rules). 
 65 See, for example, Schwartz and Scott, 113 Yale L J at 619 (cited in note 1) (“The 
welfare-maximization goal that we advance . . . cannot support many of the mandatory 
rules that today govern much contracting behavior between firms.”); id:  
A normative theory of contract law that takes party sovereignty seriously 
shows that much of the expansion of contract law over the last fifty years has 
been ill-advised. Contract law today is composed of a few default rules, many 
default standards, and a number of mandatory rules. Most of the mandatory 
rules should be repealed or reduced to defaults. 
 66 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356(1) (1981).  
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expectation interests.67 Expectation damages are the standard 
remedy for breach of contract. Hence, expectation damages typi-
cally have some mandatory status. But this raises an important 
question: How is this mandatory aspect of contract law con-
sistent with freedom of contract? 
In common-law jurisdictions, the consideration requirement 
is also a mandatory rule. At least in the typical case, parties 
cannot simply waive this requirement and turn a unilateral 
promise of a gift into a legally enforceable contract.68 This fact 
thus raises similar questions about the relationship between the 
consideration requirement and freedom of contract. 
 Finally, at any given time there are typically quite a few 
mandatory rules that require courts to determine some aspects of 
the scope or content of contractual obligations based on factors 
that go beyond the parties’ subjective intentions. Some current 
examples in American law include objective tests for intent,69 
 
 67 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356(1) (1981):  
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but on-
ly at an amount that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss 
caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss. A term fixing unrea-
sonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy 
as a penalty.  
See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356, comment a (1981) (“[T]he parties to a 
contract are not free to provide a penalty for its breach. The central objective behind the 
system of contract remedies is compensatory, not punitive.”).  
 68 See, for example, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71, comment b (1981) (“[A] 
mere pretense of bargain does not suffice, as where there is a false recital of considera-
tion or where the purported consideration is merely nominal. In such cases there is no 
consideration and the promise is enforced, if at all, as a promise binding without consid-
eration under §§ 82–94.”).  
 There are, of course, also some real or apparent exceptions to this rule. For example, 
merchants can make firm offers without consideration by merely following certain for-
malities. See UCC § 2-205 (ALI 2012). These promises often appear to involve hidden 
consideration, however, because they seek to induce actions that increase the chances of 
sale. The Restatement also suggests that option contracts might be made binding at will 
and through the use of certain formalities, though this has not been widely followed by 
courts. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 87(1)(a) (1981); Mark B. Wessman, Re-
training the Gatekeeper: Further Reflections on the Doctrine of Consideration, 29 Loyola 
LA L Rev 713, 719–23 (1996). In some states, there are still claims for breach of cove-
nant. See, for example, Hart v Pacific Rehab of Maryland, PA, 2013 WL 5212309, *18 (D 
Md) (noting that Maryland law does not require consideration for certain sealed con-
tracts). All of these exceptions are, however, just that: exceptions that prove the basic 
rule. In addition, parties do not get to freely choose whether these exceptions apply. They 
either apply or not as a matter of law. In Part III.B, I provide an empowerment-based 
account of the consideration requirement, which suggests that these exceptions are war-
ranted when the basic rationale for consideration no longer applies. 
 69 See, for example, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201 (1981) (setting forth a 
modified objective test for contract interpretation).  
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minimum wage regulations,70 the right to remain free from slav-
ery,71 the duty of good faith and fair dealing,72 and numerous 
other limitations on freedom of contract that arise from various 
public policies. 
As this last discussion shows, contractual liberty sits in ten-
sion not only with principles of contractual fairness—as Benson 
rightly observes73—but also with objective tests for intent and 
numerous limitations on freedom of contract that are rooted in 
public policy. These combined tensions pose some of the deepest 
challenges for modern contract theory, because they force theo-
rists to ask how freedom of contract might be harmonized with a 
broad set of market regulations. I would therefore reformulate 
Benson’s third question to ask the following broader question: 
[3B] How might principles of contractual liberty, as embod-
ied in the traditional principles of contract formation and 
interpretation, be harmonized with a broad set of doctrines 
that sometimes invite courts to determine the existence or 
scope of contractual obligations based on factors that go be-
yond the parties’ subjective choices? How, in other words, 
might principles of contractual liberty be harmonized not 
only with principles of contractual fairness but also with ob-
jective approaches to interpretation and various limitations 
on freedom of contract that arise from public policy?74 
Importantly, these three puzzles arise in some form not only 
with respect to contracts between individuals but also with re-
spect to contracts that involve corporations. In contracts between 
corporations, expectation damages are still the default remedy, 
and limitations on liquidated damages clauses still exist—despite 
 
 70 See, for example, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 6(a), 52 Stat 1060, 1062–63, 
codified as amended at 29 USC § 206(a) (setting forth minimum hourly wages for em-
ployees). See also 26 USC §§ 207, 212, 215 (setting forth maximum-hour limitations, 
child labor provisions, and other employment regulations). 
 71 US Const Amend XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as 
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist 
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”). 
 72 UCC § 1-302(b) (ALI 2012) (“The obligation[ ] of good faith . . . may not be dis-
claimed by agreement.”); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981) (“Every con-
tract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance 
and its enforcement.”). 
 73 Benson, The Unity of Contract Law at 119 (cited in note 3). 
 74 See id.  
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prominent economic critiques of these limitations.75 The consid-
eration requirement is still generally applicable, and courts still 
use a modified objective test for interpretation. Courts still im-
ply mandatory duties like the implied duty of good faith and fair 
dealing, and they continue to impose public policy and illegality 
exceptions to contract enforcement. Though contracts between 
corporations of equal bargaining power often lack the conditions 
needed to police bargains for fairness, as I explain below,76 that 
is an empirical fact that explains why less market regulation 
may be needed in relation to some contracts between corpora-
tions. It is not a fact that will undermine the theory of contract 
as empowerment, because contract as empowerment can explain 
this distinction. 
Together, questions 1, 2, and 3B thus present an especially 
probing threshold test for any general interpretation of contract. 
They reflect mandatory rules that are central to the common law 
of contracts and that have proved remarkably stable—at least in 
some form—in all common-law systems with advanced market 
economies.77 This particular constellation of doctrines collects 
some of the most seemingly intractable tensions in contract law 
in clear form. Each question presents independent puzzles about 
the shape of contract law,78 which partly define its core subject 
matter,79 and no current theory can jointly account for this en-
tire constellation of doctrines while explaining the legally obli-
gating force of contracts.80 It would therefore mark an important 
advance to have a single contract theory that harmonizes this 
entire constellation of doctrines. The next Part argues that con-
tract as empowerment offers this needed theory. 
III.  EMPOWERMENT IN ACTION: HOW CONTRACT AS 
EMPOWERMENT MEETS THIS CORE CHALLENGE 
No current theory of contract can account for the entire con-
stellation of doctrines identified in Part II, but contract as em-
powerment can. Contract as empowerment is, in fact, uniquely 
 
 75 For one such prominent criticism, see Robert E. Scott and George G. Triantis, 
Embedded Options and the Case against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 Colum L 
Rev 1428, 1434–56 (2004).  
 76 See Part III.C.2.  
 77 See Smith, Contract Theory at 215 (cited in note 41). 
 78 See note 58 and accompanying text. 
 79 See note 56 and accompanying text. 
 80 See Benson, The Unity of Contract Law at 118–19 (cited in note 3). 
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capable of harmonizing this entire constellation while explain-
ing the legally obligatory force of contracts. The purpose of this 
Part is to demonstrate these claims. To do this, I proceed se-
quentially. In Parts III.A, III.B, and III.C, I develop three sepa-
rate empowerment-based answers to the three core questions 
identified in Part II.  
In each case, I focus on the general rules and suggest that 
contract as empowerment offers better answers to the questions 
raised by these general rules than both economic and other lead-
ing theories. By focusing on this level of generality, I offer ex-
planations that should invite more-detailed treatments of these 
three doctrinal areas (as well as others) and will undoubtedly 
include more recommendations for legal reform. My goal in this 
introductory article is, however, to show the harmonizing power 
of contract as empowerment at the right level of generality to es-
tablish its interpretive credentials with respect to the core prin-
ciples of contract law. 
The whole of these three explanations will, moreover, be 
greater than the sum of its parts. Contract as empowerment will 
reveal how a broad range of seemingly incompatible surface val-
ues in modern contract law can work together—each serving its 
own distinct but partial role—to serve a single and normatively 
satisfying principle that is distinctive to contract. Contract as 
empowerment therefore rejects the nearly universal view that 
conflicts between these surface values—such as conflicts be-
tween fairness and efficiency—must always reflect zero-sum 
games.81 It leads to a distinctive interpretation of contract law 
and also to a distinctive interpretation of market relations. 
 
 81 The view that I am rejecting is incredibly common, though it is probably ex-
pressed most clearly in Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare 114 
Harv L Rev 961, 966 (2001) (arguing that “the assessment of legal policies should depend 
exclusively on their effects on individuals’ welfare” and that “no independent weight 
should be accorded to conceptions of fairness, such as corrective justice and desert in 
punishment”—except to the degree that concerns for these values arise in individuals’ 
welfare functions). I argue for a view in which doctrines that blend concerns for fairness 
and efficiency are justified because they combine to promote empowerment in the right 
way. The value of fairness will not depend on this value being reflected in any person’s 
taste for fairness. Nor will justifications of laws that reflect fairness considerations be 
reducible to facts about how those laws might promote utility functions that include a 
taste for fairness. 
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A. Expectation Damages and the Standard Remedies 
The first doctrinal puzzle identified in Part II asks why 
courts enforce purely executory contracts before there has been 
any reliance or harm to the victim of a breach.82 Another part of 
the puzzle is why courts use expectation damages (and, to a 
lesser extent, specific performance) as the typical remedy in 
claims for breach of contract.83 These features of doctrine can be 
puzzling because, absent some harm to the victim, it is unclear 
why the victim of a contractual breach deserves a remedy.84 It 
can also seem puzzling why contract law allows for private, but 
not public, enforcement of contracts. 
1. Expectation damages promote empowerment better than 
reliance damages. 
The first point to recognize is that expectation damages 
promote personal empowerment better than reliance damages. 
If contract is about empowerment, then contracting parties must 
have some degree of control over the level of inducement that 
they seek to generate with their contracts. This Section argues 
that expectation damages give parties the right amount of con-
trol, whereas reliance damages are often insufficient. To 
demonstrate this claim, I begin with a highly stylized example. I 
then generalize to more-ordinary contracts. 
Hence, consider the highly stylized case of a millionaire who 
would like to obtain the writing services of a person who, like 
Henry David Thoreau, is a brilliant writer but is largely disaffect-
ed by society. This writer lives a largely self-reliant life in the 
wilderness. Very few people know where this person is, and he 
likes to keep it that way. The writer is not completely self-reliant, 
however, and he knows that even a hermit’s life in the modern 
age may require some dependence on the products of modern 
markets. He has therefore used the money from his early books to 
set up a small trust for himself, which gives him a monthly 
 
 82 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347 (1981); Benson, The Unity of Con-
tract Law at 119 (cited in note 3). 
 83 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 347, 35960 (1981). 
 84 This is because there has not yet been any harm caused to the victim of the breach. 
For a classic discussion, see Fuller and Perdue, 46 Yale L J at 57–66 (cited in note 51) (dis-
cussing the purposes behind awarding contract damages, which especially include protec-
tion of reliance interests and protection from the harms caused by reliance on breached 
contracts); id at 52–53 (“Yet in this case we ‘compensate’ the plaintiff by giving him some-
thing he never had. This seems on the face of things a queer kind of ‘compensation.’”).  
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stipend to use for basic necessities. His sister—who is an attor-
ney—handles his legal affairs. 
Assume further that this writer’s trust contains just enough 
money for him to survive through old age but that the writer has 
always wanted to travel to Tibet and does not have enough mon-
ey for the trip. The commercial market for his poetry is not very 
robust, and there is no real hope that he will ever make enough 
money for the trip by seeking regular employment. The writer 
therefore believes the trip is a pipe dream. He is not interested 
in engaging in any regular employment. To make the example 
even more concrete, assume that the writer could obtain only 
$100 from the ordinary market for his poetry and that his trip 
would cost at least one hundred times more than that. Although 
he is willing to write a poem for a trip to Tibet, his poetry does 
not currently have that market value. 
The millionaire is nevertheless willing to pay more than one 
hundred times the current market price for this poem. This 
might be for any number of reasons: The millionaire might have 
a special taste for the writer’s poetry, which makes the much 
higher price well worth it to him. Or the millionaire might be-
lieve that the market is simply wrong, because this writer is an 
undiscovered genius whose works will go up in market value 
over time. Finally, this particular sum of money may be less 
valuable to the millionaire than to many other people, due to the 
declining marginal utility of money.85 Hence, the millionaire 
might be more willing to take a risk on the writer than others 
would be, and he may be able to do so consistent with meeting 
his other aims and interests.86 Regardless of his particular rea-
sons, the millionaire is willing and able to promise the writer a 
trip to Tibet in return for a poem. 
In these circumstances, it might disempower the millionaire 
if courts were to use only a reliance measure of damages. Under 
this standard, no matter how much the millionaire promises for 
 
 85 See, for example, Joshua Greene and Jonathan Baron, Intuitions about Declining 
Marginal Utility, 14 J Behav Dec Making 243, 243–44 (2001) (describing how subjective 
judgments about the desirability of money show that money typically has decreasing 
marginal utility). 
 86 This may be because the millionaire is rationally responding to the increased 
liquidity and financial insurance that his other assets bring. There is now, however, a 
solid and growing body of evidence that poverty causes risk aversion and time dis-
counting that cannot be attributed to the relative absence of factors like these. See 
generally Johannes Haushofer and Ernst Fehr, On the Psychology of Poverty, 344 Sci-
ence 862 (2014). 
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the poem, the writer could expect to obtain compensation only 
for any harms—including any monetizable lost opportunity 
costs—caused by reasonable reliance on the millionaire’s prom-
ise. By stipulation, however, this is at least one hundred times 
less than what the writer needs for a trip to Tibet,87 and the 
writer is unwilling to engage in any employment at all for so 
small a sum. Hence, the legal assurance of reliance damages 
would be insufficient, on its own, to motivate the writer to write 
the poem. 
It would, on the other hand, empower the millionaire if 
courts were to use an expectation measure of damages. Under 
this rule, if the millionaire were to promise a trip to Tibet in ex-
change for a poem, the writer could trust that—in return for the 
poem—he would obtain either a trip to Tibet or the trip’s fair 
market value, which he could then use to purchase the trip for 
himself. The millionaire could thus motivate the writer to write 
the poem by making a legally enforceable promise. 
The reason that expectation damages are more empowering 
than reliance damages in this highly stylized case is simple: 
they allow the millionaire to provide an assurance of more than 
just compensation for reliance harms, which—in this case—is 
needed for the promise to influence the writer’s actions. One 
might therefore object that reliance damages are typically suffi-
cient to motivate contracting parties, and that the current ar-
gument applies only to certain highly nonstandard cases.88 Pro-
fessor Lon Fuller and attorney William Perdue have, in fact, 
famously argued that expectation damages often provide a reli-
able measure of reliance harms, due in large part to the fact that 
they can cover lost opportunity costs.89  
Even Fuller and Perdue acknowledged, however, that this 
claim is “most forceful in a hypothetical society in which all val-
ues [are] available on the market and where all markets [are] 
‘perfect’ in the economic sense.”90 The case of the writer is not 
like this: the monetizable opportunity costs are only $100. But 
 
 87 It may, in fact, be less, because the writer was not looking for other work and did 
not have any other commercial opportunities on the horizon. 
 88 I thank Professor Robert Hillman for pressing me on this point. 
 89 Fuller and Perdue, 46 Yale L J at 60 (cited in note 51) (“[If] we take into ac-
count ‘gains prevented’ by reliance, that is, losses involved in foregoing the opportuni-
ty to enter other contracts, the notion that the rule protecting the expectancy is adopt-
ed as the most effective means of compensating for detrimental reliance seems not at 
all far-fetched.”). 
 90 Id at 62. 
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because Fuller and Perdue acknowledged that it is only in the 
hypothetical world they described that expectation damages are 
perfect proxies for reliance damages, their own view was that 
some aspects of expectation damages (which go beyond the pro-
tection of reliance interests in the real world) must be under-
stood as having “a quasi-criminal aspect, [their] purpose being 
not so much to compensate the promisee as to penalize breach of 
promise by the promisor.”91  
The problem with this explanation is that this additional 
amount is highly variable, generally hard to know, inconsistent-
ly related to the magnitude of the wrong, and completely insen-
sitive to whether a breach is intentional. Hence, this purportedly 
“quasi-criminal” aspect of expectation damages is poorly suited 
to serve the standard punitive aims of notice, uniformity, pro-
portionality, and sensitivity to desert and culpability.92 
Still, Fuller and Perdue were right that the real world is not 
like the hypothetical world in which their reliance-based account 
works best. Real people are not perfectly rational,93 and real 
markets are not perfectly competitive.94 Transaction costs 
abound,95 and real market prices tend merely to approximate 
(and sometimes even to deviate from) the equilibrium prices 
 
 91 Id at 61. 
 92 See Michael S. Moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law 
186–87, 225–29 (Oxford 2010). 
 93 See, for example, Daniel Kahneman, A Psychological Perspective on Economics, 
93 Am Econ Rev Papers & Proceedings 162, 162–65 (2003) (reviewing experimental evi-
dence of some systematic irrationality in human psychology); id at 162: 
No one ever seriously believed that all people have rational beliefs and make 
rational decisions all the time. The assumption of rationality is generally un-
derstood to be an approximation, which is made in the belief (or hope) that de-
partures from rationality are rare when the stakes are significant, or that they 
will disappear under the discipline of the market. 
For an important discussion of some consequences of these facts for law, see generally 
Korobkin and Ulen, 88 Cal L Rev 1051 (cited in note 31). 
 94 See, for example, J. Peter Neary, Presidential Address: Globalization and Market 
Structure, 1 J Eur Econ Assn 245, 245 (2003) (reviewing the “economic aspects of globali-
zation” and arguing “that they cannot be satisfactorily addressed in perfectly or monopo-
listically competitive models”). 
 95 For a nice discussion of such costs, see Nathan B. Oman, Markets as a Moral 
Foundation for Contract Law, 98 Iowa L Rev 183, 190 & n 31 (2012): 
The deeper problem with an economic defense of markets is the ubiquity of 
transaction costs. . . . Market actors in the real world face ubiquitous infor-
mation costs, bargaining costs, search costs, and the like. These transaction 
costs cannot be dismissed as negligible frictions. . . . Indeed, one study conclud-
ed that roughly forty percent of the entire U.S. economy consisted of private 
transaction costs. 
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that would be based on actual supply and demand.96 Even when 
market prices are in equilibrium, they sum up vast amounts of 
highly dispersed information and present it in a normalized 
form.97 Market prices therefore fail to reflect the actual—and 
often idiosyncratic—values that many real people place on many 
 
 96 This point about approximation follows from two observations about microeco-
nomic theory as applied to questions of price determination and market equilibria. The 
first is that “[t]he actions of buyers and sellers naturally move markets toward the equi-
librium of supply and demand.” N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Microeconomics 77 
(Cengage 7th ed 2014). To the extent that markets are dynamic and real market prices 
are in flux, real market prices should therefore tend merely to approximate market equi-
librium prices. See Jean-Philippe Bouchaud, J. Doyne Farmer, and Fabrizio Lillo, How 
Markets Slowly Digest Changes in Supply and Demand, in Thorsten Hens and Klaus 
Reiner Schenk-Hoppe, eds, Handbook of Financial Markets: Dynamics and Evolution 57, 
148 (Elsevier 2009). Second, the proposition that market prices naturally move toward 
market equilibria is premised on several theoretical idealizations, which have been chal-
lenged in the main text—for example, that there is perfect market competition, rational 
action, complete information, and an absence of market externalities. See Mankiw, Prin-
ciples of Microeconomics at 47–88 (cited in note 96). Deviations like these need not under-
mine the claim that prices naturally move toward the market equilibrium. See generally, 
for example, Aldo Rustichini, Mark A. Satterthwaite, and Steven R. Williams, Convergence 
to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information, 62 Econometrica 1041 (1994) 
(arguing that some deviations between actual trading behavior and true preferences, 
which might otherwise undermine the efficiency of a market, tend to vanish as market size 
increases). Still, facts like these suggest that real market prices are better understood as 
tending toward approximation than toward idealization. See, for example, Angus Deaton 
and Guy Laroque, On the Behaviour of Commodity Prices, 59 Rev Econ Stud 1, 4 (1992) 
(“For most of the thirteen commodity prices . . . the behaviour of prices from one year to 
the next conforms to the predictions of the theory about conditional expectations and 
conditional variances.”) (emphasis added). There is, finally, some empirical and theoreti-
cal evidence that market prices can deviate more sharply from those expected by ideal 
microeconomic theory in some contexts. See, for example, Kent D. Daniel, David Hirshleifer, 
and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Overconfidence, Arbitrage, and Equilibrium Asset Pric-
ing, 56 J Fin 921, 957 (2001) (explaining that, in the context of securities markets, “mis-
valuation of industry or market-wide factors persists”); Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg and 
Michael M. Knetter, Good Prices and Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned?, 35 J 
Econ Lit 1243, 1244 (1997) (“[I]t appears that the local currency prices of foreign products 
do not respond fully to exchange rates.”). See also generally Ivana Kubicová and Luboš 
Komárek, The Classification and Identification of Asset Price Bubbles, 61 Czech J Econ & 
Fin 34 (2011) (discussing the classification of price bubbles and ways to identify them). 
 97 For a classic discussion of this normalizing function, see F.A. Hayek, The Use of 
Knowledge in Society, 35 Am Econ Rev 519, 519 (1945): 
The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is deter-
mined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which 
we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form, but solely 
as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge 
which all the separate individuals possess. 
See also id at 526–27 (“We must look at the price system as such a mechanism for com-
municating information if we want to understand its real function. . . . In abbreviated 
form, by a kind of symbol, only the most essential information is passed on, and passed 
on only to those concerned.”). 
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real goods and services.98 It is in circumstances like these that 
real parties need to compete for the attention of their contract-
ing counterparties. For the real world, we therefore need an ac-
count of expectation damages that neither relies on their pur-
portedly quasi-criminal functions nor reduces them to mere 
proxies for reliance damages. 
Contract as empowerment offers the needed explanation. 
Although expectation damages do not always serve as perfect 
proxies for reliance damages in the real world, expectation dam-
ages do tend to give promisors greater ability to choose the level 
of inducement that they seek to generate by making legally en-
forceable promises. Expectation damages are therefore typically 
more empowering than reliance damages.  
Notice, moreover, that this explanation does not depend on 
any of the idealized assumptions that are needed to establish 
the claim that expectation damages serve as perfect proxies for 
reliance damages. To the contrary, it is precisely because of 
these differences between expectation and reliance damages 
that expectation damages are typically more empowering than 
reliance damages. The present account also explains contract 
law’s focus on expectation damages in terms of personal empow-
erment rather than in terms of a quasi-criminal aspect to pri-
vate law. Hence, the present account not only is better on the 
merits but also helps clarify how contract law is distinct from 
criminal law.99 
The contract between the millionaire and the writer is 
therefore not as extraordinary as it might seem. It merely exag-
gerates certain features of run-of-the-mill contracts to make a 
point. The point is that expectation damages generally give pri-
vate parties more control over the assurances that they can pro-
vide with their contracts than reliance damages do. In many 
real-world circumstances, expectation damages are therefore 
 
 98 See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv L Rev 
509, 521 n 25 (1986) (describing how “the market value of nonfungible property, such as 
a home, is typically less than subjective value”). 
 99 In Contract Theory—Who Needs It?, Professor Avery W. Katz argues that a num-
ber of recent contract theorists fail to account for what he believes is “[t]he key feature of 
contract law, as opposed to the other standard first-year subjects”—namely, that con-
tract law “affords private parties the power of lawmaking.” Avery W. Katz, Book Review, 
Contract Theory—Who Needs It?, 81 U Chi L Rev 2043, 2046 (2014). Contract as empow-
erment clearly avoids that problem. But it also goes a step further to explain why this 
private lawmaking power is distinct from the power to make criminal law. The present 
account thereby explains a further dimension of what distinguishes contract law from 
criminal law. 
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more empowering than reliance damages. Hence, promisors who 
seek to influence other private parties by entering into legally 
enforceable contracts have an empowerment interest in their en-
forcement with an expectation damages remedy. These promi-
sors cannot both make promises like these and reasonably reject 
a legal rule that allows their promisees to seek expectation 
damages, rather than reliance damages, in cases of breach. 
2. Empowerment offers a better explanation than efficient 
breach. 
It is one thing to explain why contract law allows nothing 
less than expectation damages in the typical case and quite an-
other to explain why it allows nothing more. Why, in other 
words, does contract law not allow punitive damages or specific 
performance as the standard remedy? 
Many people think that economic theories of efficient breach 
provide one of the best answers to this question.100 When parties 
who breach contracts are forced to pay expectation damages and 
nothing more, two consequences are said to follow. First, by vir-
tue of obtaining expectation damages, victims of breaches are 
left no worse off than if the contracts had been fully per-
formed.101 Second, by requiring nothing more than expectation 
damages, parties who find new opportunities to increase their per-
sonal welfare by breaching are incentivized to do so—at least so 
long as these benefits are larger than the costs of paying expecta-
tion damages.102 It is thus sometimes said, even by critics of eco-
nomic theories of contract, that a “program of expectation damag-
es, if faithfully implemented, satisfies not only the [Kaldor]-Hicks 
standard of hypothetical compensation but the more restrictive 
Pareto standards of efficiency as well: not only is there a net 
 
 100 See, for example, Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equili-
bration, 99 Colum L Rev 857, 859 (1999) (“[T]he centrality of efficient breach to contract 
theory has led us to think of the obligation of contract as the choice between performing 
and breaching at a price.”). 
 101 See, for example, Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the 
Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S Cal L Rev 629, 636 & n 9 (1988); Robert L. Birmingham, 
Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 Rutgers L Rev 273, 
281 (1970), citing Samuel Williston, 5 A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 1338 at 3762–
63 (Baker, Voorhis rev ed 1937). 
 102 Craswell, 61 S Cal L Rev at 634 (cited in note 101). To use the language of eco-
nomics, the costs of any such breaches are thereby effectively “internalized” by the 
breaching parties. 
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social gain for the contracting parties, but no one is left worse off 
after breach than before.”103 
By contrast, one might think that contract as empowerment 
recommends either specific performance or punitive damages as 
a general rule. These remedies might appear more empowering, 
because they provide promisees with an even greater assurance 
of performance than expectation damages provide. 
These first impressions are misleading. A more careful look 
at the issue suggests that contract as empowerment offers an al-
ternative explanation of this standard remedial limitation. In 
addition, this explanation, which I will now provide, turns out to 
have several advantages over economic explanations. 
To understand why this is so, let us return to the case of the 
millionaire and the writer. The writer in this case was willing to 
write a poem for the millionaire in return for a trip to Tibet. It 
thus empowered the millionaire to be able to provide the writer 
with that specific level of legal assurance. The writer’s interest 
in obtaining a trip to Tibet can, however, be met by handing him 
either the physical tickets or the money for the tickets. Expecta-
tion damages are therefore sufficient for the millionaire’s em-
powerment purposes in this case. 
Because neither specific performance nor punitive damages 
are needed for the millionaire’s empowerment purposes, the mil-
lionaire could reasonably reject a legal rule that allowed for spe-
cific performance or punitive damages for breach of this con-
tract. But he could not reasonably reject a legal rule that 
allowed for expectation damages—for reasons explained in the 
previous Section. Far from endorsing specific performance or 
punitive damages in the typical case, contract as empowerment 
thus explains why damages that exceed expectation damages 
 
 103 Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J Legal Stud 1, 3 (1989). As 
Professor Jules L. Coleman has explained: 
We can distinguish between Pareto optimality and Pareto superiority. . . . A 
state of affairs S is Pareto superior to another, A, if and only if no one prefers A 
to S and at least one person prefers S to A. The notion of Pareto optimality is 
then defined with respect to Pareto superiority. A state of affairs S is Pareto 
optimal provided there is no state of affairs Sn that is Pareto superior to it. 
Jules L. Coleman, Book Review, The Grounds of Welfare, 112 Yale L J 1511, 1516 (2003). 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is defined in slightly different terms: “One state of affairs, S, is 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient to another, A, if and only if the winners under S could compensate 
the losers such that, after compensation, no one would prefer A to S and at least one per-
son would prefer S to A.” Id at 1517. 
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can reflect morally impermissible uses of state coercion in cases 
like these. 
This argument can now be further generalized by considering 
some of the facts cited by efficient breach theorists. When the mil-
lionaire made his original promise, he knew or should have 
known that circumstances might change in ways that would 
make it better for him if he could pay the fair market value of the 
trip and be released from the contract.104 For example, the mil-
lionaire might contract for the poem and receive it. Just as he is 
about to purchase the ticket for the writer, however, he might 
learn that his long-estranged daughter will be in Tibet for a very 
limited time. To see his daughter, the millionaire must leave im-
mediately. But there is a catch: There is only one ticket left on the 
currently listed flights to Tibet. Other flights will be listed soon 
enough, but the millionaire will be unable to personally arrange 
the writer’s flight to Tibet because of its remote location. 
In these circumstances, should the writer really have the le-
gal authority to demand specific performance and thereby pre-
vent the millionaire from seeing his daughter? The writer’s ac-
tual interests in this contract can be met by receiving either the 
ticket or its fair market value. Hence, the writer cannot reason-
ably reject a legal rule that limits his remedy to expectation 
damages. For reasons already explained, the millionaire can, on 
the other hand, reasonably reject a rule that allows for more 
than expectation damages—that is, for specific performance or 
punitive damages. On the present account, it would therefore be 
wrong—morally wrong—to allow the writer to invoke the state’s 
coercive power to force performance and make the millionaire 
miss seeing his daughter. This type of argument is, moreover, 
perfectly generalizable to any case in which parties can obtain 
substitutes for performance on an open market. 
This explanation of the expectation damages remedy cites 
some of the same facts that efficient breach theorists emphasize, 
but it reinterprets them in ways that offer three major im-
provements over efficient breach theory. First, as is now well-
known, efficiency considerations do not uniquely recommend ex-
pectation damages.105 In circumstances in which breach would be 
 
 104 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 
Mich L Rev 1349, 1353 (2009) (“Involuntary breaches are often inefficient: the promisor 
miscalculated his ability to comply with the contractual terms to which he had agreed.”). 
 105 See, for example, Richard R.W. Brooks, The Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 
116 Yale L J 568, 578–79 (2006) (discussing how combinations of remedies other than 
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efficient, legal rules that allow specific performance or punitive 
damages would still allow parties to renegotiate their con-
tracts.106 At least in principle, parties should therefore be able to 
capture these same efficiency gains through renegotiation, albeit 
with a different typical distribution.107 
In some circumstances, transaction costs can make one of 
these remedies more efficient than the others. When transaction 
costs are equal, however, efficient breach theory cannot be used 
to choose among them.108 Hence, efficient breach theory cannot 
be used to explain the relative generality of expectation damages 
as a default remedy in contract law or its mandatory character. 
The first interpretive advantage of contract as empowerment is 
that it explains why expectation damages are typically favored 
over specific performance and punitive damages—even in many 
cases in which these alternative remedies would be equally or 
even more efficient.109 
 
expectation damages can be “equally efficient and potentially more consistent with the 
other normative understandings of contract enforcement”); Ian Ayres and Kristin 
Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and Contracts, 148 U Pa L 
Rev 45, 56 (1999) (“While it is nigh-on impossible to construct a single damage rule that 
will induce efficient behavior along all possible dimensions, giving defendants the op-
tions of inalienability and additur leads toward more efficient plaintiff precaution and, 
under certain conditions, more efficient defendant reliance.”) (citation omitted); Ian 
Ayres and Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of 
Legal Rules, 101 Yale L J 729, 760–62 (1992) (demonstrating that different damages re-
gimes would be more efficient in different circumstances). For a useful discussion, see 
Smith, Contract Theory at 120 (cited in note 41). 
 106 Smith, Contract Theory at 120 (cited in note 41) (“As economists themselves have 
pointed out, . . . if performance of a particular contractual obligation is indeed inefficient, 
the relevant contracting parties will have incentives to renegotiate or ‘bargain around’ a 
rule of specific performance so as to reach the efficient result.”). 
 107 Id at 120–24. 
 108 See Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades: Suc-
cess or Failure?, 112 Yale L J 829, 835 (2003) (noting that the possibility of renegotiation 
prior to performance has proved problematic for efficient breach theorists because effi-
cient performance will occur regardless of the remedy when renegotiation costs are low 
enough). 
 109 Professors Robert Scott and George Triantis have, for example, argued that the 
rule disfavoring penalty liquidated damages and specific performance in favor of expecta-
tion damages is sometimes less efficient than one that threatens punishment or that allows 
private parties a greater role in assessing option prices for breach. Scott and Triantis, 104 
Colum L Rev at 1480–86 (cited in note 75). But as these authors have freely acknowl-
edged, their argument suggests that the standing law of contract remedies cannot be 
grounded purely in efficiency concerns. Id at 1428 (“[T]his Article [ ] makes the case 
against the expectation damages default rule.”). Professor William S. Dodge has similar-
ly argued that efficiency considerations favor punitive damages for willful breaches. See 
generally William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 Duke L J 
629 (1999). But this too is not the law. Hence, to whatever extent arguments like these 
have merit, contract as empowerment offers a better, and not just an equally compelling, 
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At the same time, however, this explanation is limited to cas-
es in which the parties’ actual interests can be met by obtaining 
substitutes on an open market at a value that is easily ascertain-
able by courts. That fact explains why courts allow exceptions for 
specific performance in cases in which items are unique or expec-
tation damages are especially hard to calculate. When it comes to 
promises for unique items or promises for which expectation 
damages may become difficult to calculate, contract law would not 
be empowering absent an assurance of specific performance. 
A second interpretive advantage of the present theory is 
that it explains why expectation damages are consistent with 
the legally obligatory force of both contracts and promises. 
Although obligations purport to override or exclude some conse-
quentialist reasons,110 the theory of efficient breach implies—to 
the contrary—that contractual obligations can always be 
breached on consequentialist grounds.111 This effectively deni-
grates the status of contractual obligations and misrepresents 
the way that they figure into courts’ reasoning and into the lives 
of ordinary contracting parties.112 
To the extent that markets and promise keeping reflect two 
centrally important features of modern social life, perceived 
schisms between them can cause tensions in contemporary soci-
ety. Professor Shiffrin makes the point in an especially poignant 
manner. She suggests that by discrediting the obligatory force of 
promises, “the culture created by contract law and its justifica-
tions might make it more difficult to nurture and sustain moral 
agency, in particular the virtues associated with fidelity.”113 Two 
centrally important aspects of modern human social life—
 
account of the ordinary remedial rules in contract law than efficiency theories. See 
Smith, Contract Theory at 120–23 (cited in note 41) (noting that specific performance 
might be the more efficient remedy in cases in which damages are either harder or more 
costly to measure, such that “[o]rdering specific performance avoids the possibility of un-
dercompensation (and, for that matter, overcompensation) entirely”). 
 110 This is, in fact, an intrinsic feature of law’s basic nature, as described differently 
by theorists like Professors H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of 
Law 82–91 (Oxford 3d ed 2012); Joseph Raz, The Authority of the Law 233–49 (Oxford 2d 
ed 2009). See also Kar, 95 Georgetown L J at 435–37 (cited in note 33).  
 111 See Gil Lahav, A Principle of Justified Promise-Breaking and Its Application to 
Contract Law, 57 NYU Ann Surv Am L 163, 163 (2000). 
 112 See Hart, The Concept of Law at 57, 89–91 (cited in note 110) (discussing the “in-
ternal point of view”); Kar, 84 Tex L Rev at 925–27 (cited in note 12) (explaining Judge 
Richard Posner’s argument that adopting a contrarian decision posture will “result in a 
standard that requires us to maximize efficiency or pareto-optimal states of affairs”); Scott 
J. Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of View?, 75 Fordham L Rev 1157, 1158–61 (2006). 
 113 Shiffrin, 120 Harv L Rev at 712–13 (cited in note 58). 
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namely, the interpersonal morality of promise keeping and mod-
ern market exchange—can therefore appear to be pitted against 
one another in an unresolvable conflict.  
Importantly, this problem appears to arise not simply from 
divergences between contract and promise (here, at the remedial 
stage) but rather from prevailing economic justifications of the 
expectation damages remedy—which imply that obligations can 
always be breached on purely consequentialist grounds.114 I be-
lieve that it is damaging to modern human society, and can 
cause great moral and psychic tensions, if people are forced to 
view their moral and economic lives so schizophrenically—that 
is, as simultaneously prohibiting and endorsing interpersonal 
relations that are purely instrumental in form.115 
Contract as empowerment offers an alternative justification 
for the expectation damages remedy, which can help resolve 
these tensions. Rather than implying that people can always 
breach their obligations to one another on consequentialist 
grounds, it articulates moral reasons of obligation for limiting 
contractual remedies to expectation damages in the typical case. 
This is because contract as empowerment is rooted in a more 
general account of moral obligation, which simultaneously ex-
plains the morality of promises and places moral limits on when 
promises should be legally enforceable. Rather than undermin-
ing the obligatory status of either promises or contracts, contract 
as empowerment thus gives moral promises their own space. It 
then construes contracts, when they exist, to contain at least two 
distinct legal obligations. The primary legal obligation—owed by 
each promisor to each promisee—is to perform, conditional on 
performance by the other. The secondary legal obligation—owed 
by each promisee to each promisor—is to excuse nonperformance 
in return for expectation damages in the typical case. This more 
complex suite of contractual obligations is justified by the fact 
that it is sufficiently and equally empowering to both parties in 
the typical case. Hence, there are no empowerment-related 
grounds for either party to reasonably reject a system of legal 
obligations with these properties. 
Contract as empowerment thus reinterprets the expecta-
tion damages remedy in ways that render it consistent with 
both the interpersonal morality of promises and the genuinely 
 
 114 See id. 
 115 See id at 714 (“It does not follow [ ] that legal principles in these domains should 
be entirely insensitive to or divorced from the demands of interpersonal morality.”). 
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legally obligating force of contracts. In some cases, remedial di-
vergences will and should still persist between promise and con-
tract. Consider, for example, the case of a father who promises 
his daughter that he will attend her graduation. Assume that 
the two are very close and have sufficient interpersonal trust for 
the father to influence his daughter’s actions with a promise 
that is not legally enforceable. Influence is not really the point, 
however, because the daughter will go to her graduation regard-
less, and the father is not really trying to influence his daugh-
ter’s actions in any way with his promise. He promises his 
daughter that he will be there in order to show his love for her, 
to give her some peace of mind, and to assure her that he values 
sharing this moment with her more than promoting his narrow-
er self-interest.116 
In these circumstances, it would be morally wrong for the 
father to break his promise to his daughter simply because a 
better economic opportunity has arisen. But it would only add 
insult to injury if this promise were legally enforceable with ex-
pectation damages and if the father felt that he was permitted to 
simply breach and send a check for the “fair market value” of his 
presence (however that might be calculated). Far from constitut-
ing an adequate remedy for this breach, this payment would 
signal that the father considers his presence in his daughter’s 
life at this important moment to be fungible for cash. But any 
legal enforceability of this promise, including specific perfor-
mance to force the father to attend, might make their relation-
ship appear too distant and dependent on legal formalisms. 
These attitudes and reliance on legal remedies might damage 
their relationship, not remedy it.117 
Although this promise is morally obligatory, contract as em-
powerment can explain why it should not be legally enforceable—
without denigrating its moral status. Because the father was not 
trying to influence his daughter’s actions in any way that rea-
sonably required the legal enforceability of his promise for the 
influence to work, there are no empowerment-related grounds to 
treat this particular promise as a legally enforceable contract. 
 
 116 Professor Scanlon discusses this in his ground for the morality of promise keep-
ing. See T.M. Scanlon, Promises and Contracts, in Benson, ed, The Theory of Contract 
Law 86, 106 (cited in note 3). 
 117 This is, of course, a major theme in some contract-law scholarship. See, for ex-
ample, Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 Cal L 
Rev 821, 823 (1997) (“[T]he world of gift would be impoverished if simple donative prom-
ises were placed into the world of contract.”). 
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Hence, the father could reasonably reject a legal rule that required 
him to perform or pay expectation damages. He could reasonably 
reject this legal rule, even though he could not reasonably reject a 
moral rule that gave his daughter the right to demand that he ac-
tually attend on pain of damage to the relationship.118 
The important point to notice is that none of these explana-
tions calls the obligatory force of either promises or contracts in-
to question. On the current view, remedial divergences like 
these arise not from any denigration of obligations but from the 
fact that morality simultaneously generates promissory obliga-
tions, some limits on the state’s authority to coerce moral ac-
tions, and some legal obligations (among some contracting par-
ties) to accept expectation damages in lieu of performance. 
Unlike theories of efficient breach, which can exacerbate ten-
sions between the spheres of interpersonal morality and the 
modern marketplace, contract as empowerment can therefore 
reconcile these spheres in a deeper and more meaningful way. 
This interpretation of contract can help relieve some of the social 
and psychic tensions that people feel when moving between the 
spheres of informal social interaction and the marketplace.119 
Contract as empowerment can thus help people flourish better—
and simultaneously—as both moral and economic agents. 
The third interpretive advantage of the present account is 
that it explains why, as a general rule, it is only the private par-
ties to contracts—as opposed to third parties or public authori-
ties—who have the legal standing to sue for breach of contract.120 
By making legally enforceable promises, contracting parties typi-
cally seek to influence the actions of their private counterpar-
ties—but not, at least directly, those of public authorities, third 
parties, or the state. Hence, contracting parties cannot reasonably 
reject a legal rule that gives their particular contracting counter-
parties the legal authority to demand compliance; but contracting 
parties can reasonably reject a broader rule that allows other 
 
 118 Scanlon presents an argument that no one could reasonably reject a moral rule 
that requires performance in these circumstances, but his argument is rooted in the val-
ue of assurance, not empowerment. See generally Scanlon, Promises and Contracts (cited 
in note 116). 
 119 See Shiffrin, 120 Harv L Rev at 709 (cited in note 58) (“[T]he legal norms regu-
lating these promises diverge in substance from the moral norms that apply to them. 
This divergence raises questions about how the moral agent is to navigate both the legal 
and moral systems.”). 
 120 See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 Cornell 
L Rev 275, 306–07 (2008).  
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parties (like third parties or the state) to sue. Put simply, promi-
sors have no empowerment interests at stake in that broader 
type of legal enforceability. 
For all of the above reasons, contract as empowerment of-
fers a better account of the general rules governing contractual 
remedies than orthodox economic and philosophical accounts. 
B. The Consideration Requirement 
The second doctrinal puzzle identified in Part II concerns 
the centrality of the consideration requirement. At least in 
common-law systems, the general rule is that, in claims for 
breach of contract, parties can enforce only promises that are 
supported by consideration.121 A promise is supported by consid-
eration if there is (1) a return promise or performance from an-
other party that was (2) “bargained for” in the following tech-
nical sense: it was both (2a) “sought by the [original] promisor in 
exchange for [the original] promise” and (2b) “given by the [orig-
inal] promisee in exchange for that promise.”122 There are also 
several well-known exceptions to this requirement, but the point 
of this Section is to show how contract as empowerment can ex-
plain the general features of this rule.123 
Although many scholars find the consideration requirement 
puzzling,124 contract as empowerment offers a straightforward 
 
 121 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 17 (1981). 
 122 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 (1981). 
 123 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 82–94 (1981). 
 124 Many theories are, in fact, highly ambivalent about this requirement. Promise-
based theories can offer no rationale at all for consideration, because consideration limits 
the class of promises that are deemed legally obligatory. These theories recommend get-
ting rid of the limitation altogether, because the doctrine is inconsistent with the idea 
that voluntary promises should be enforced in accordance with their terms and because 
there is no analogue to the consideration doctrine in the ordinary morality of promise 
keeping. Professor Fried has thus argued that the modern consideration doctrine is both 
analytically confused and inconsistent with the basic promissory rationales that he takes 
to underwrite modern contract law. Fried, Contract as Promise at 28–39 (cited in note 
37). Efficiency theorists, by contrast, will have a much easier time accounting for the 
centrality of the consideration doctrine. They can begin with the observation that the 
legal enforcement of promises is always somewhat costly. Modern markets nevertheless 
produce enormous increases in wealth and social welfare. There are also good reasons to 
think that we must enforce promises that are parts of bargained-for exchanges if we 
hope to maintain the conditions of trust needed for strangers to enter into and fulfill 
market exchanges through promissory exchanges. Because legal enforcement of these 
exchanges greatly expands the bounds of our cooperation, allows modern markets to 
flourish, and allows larger-scale cooperative efforts and divisions of labor, the benefits of 
enforcing these exchanges greatly outweigh the costs. At least plausibly, however, the 
same cannot be said for the enforcement of unilateral promises. Unilateral promises are 
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explanation of the requirement. Contract as empowerment roots 
contractual obligations in promisors’ empowerment interests—
where “empowerment” is defined as the ability to use legally en-
forceable promises to influence other people’s actions and there-
by meet a broad range of human needs and interests. The criti-
cal point to recognize is that this explanation is therefore limited 
to a special subclass of promises. Which promises are these? 
They are all and only those promises that promisors seek to use 
as tools to induce a promise or performance from someone else in 
return and that reasonably require legal enforceability for the 
influence to work. 
Actually, even this subclass is too broad because not all such 
promises succeed at producing any influence. A promisor can 
reasonably reject a rule that gives promisees the legal right to 
demand compliance, backed by the coercive power of the state, 
before there has been any promise or performance in return. But 
once having influenced another person’s actions by making a 
promise like this, a promisor can no longer reasonably reject 
such a legal rule. Hence, contract as empowerment recommends 
the legal enforcement of promises as contracts only if there is 
(1) a return promise or performance by another party that both 
is (2a) sought by the original promisor in exchange for the prom-
ise and reasonably requires legal enforceability for the induction 
to work, and is (2b) given by the original promisee in exchange 
for that legally enforceable promise. 
It follows—with almost mathematical elegance—that con-
tract as empowerment recommends the legal enforcement of all 
and only those promises that are supported by legal considera-
tion in the technical sense of the word. Indeed, the Restatement 
states: 
(1) To constitute consideration, a performance or a return 
promise must be bargained for. (2) A performance or return 
promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in 
 
by definition promises that seek nothing in return and, hence, are not being used to in-
duce others to engage in any reciprocally advantageous exchanges. The stability of mod-
ern markets in no way depends on enforcing these promises, and there are no other obvi-
ous, large-scale social welfare benefits that depend on their enforcement. The ordinary 
costs of their enforcement are therefore more likely to outweigh any benefits. By provid-
ing at least a plausible rationale for the consideration doctrine, efficiency theorists can 
thus claim a second important explanatory advantage over promise-based theories. 
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exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in ex-
change for that promise.125 
In accordance with the primary account of contract as empow-
erment, I call these “true contracts” to distinguish them from 
other classes of promises that are legally enforceable. 
Contract as empowerment recommends that true con-
tracts—in the sense of promises that are supported by legal con-
sideration—be legally enforceable. But it does much more than 
that. It also explains why parties cannot generally avoid the 
consideration requirement through the mere formality of stating 
that consideration exists.126 Although courts do not typically in-
quire into the adequacy of consideration, they do typically re-
quire some real consideration for contracts to be formed.127 There 
must, in other words, be some return promise or performance 
that the original promisor actually sought to induce with the 
original promise and that the original promisee actually gave in 
return for the original promise.128 
In the famous case of Schnell v Nell,129 for example, the 
court found that a promise to devise $200 to each of three lega-
tees “in consideration of one cent” was not supported by consid-
eration.130 The court explained that “[t]he consideration of one 
cent [was], plainly, in this case, merely nominal.”131 In coming to 
this conclusion, the court was not finding the consideration to be 
inadequate. The problem was not substantive unfairness but ra-
ther lack of an actual bargain: this promisor was not really try-
ing to induce the payment of one cent by making a legally en-
forceable promise. She was instead seeking to make her 
subjective will legally enforceable as a contract by recasting a 
unilateral promise of a gift into the apparent form of a bargain. 
The court’s ruling that this was not a true contract, because it 
 
 125 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 (1981). The present theory also recom-
mends a further limitation to promises that reasonably require legal enforcement to in-
fluence action. This recommendation rules out the legal enforceability of most social 
promises, and it is largely consistent with the state of the law. I will, however, discuss 
this limitation only later. See Part III.B. 
 126 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71, comment b (1981) (“[A] mere pre-
tense of bargain does not suffice, as where there is a false recital of consideration.”). 
There are some exceptions to this rule, for things like option contracts, but I discuss 
those exceptions separately in Part III.B.3. 
 127 See Wessman, 29 Loyola LA L Rev at 774–75 (cited in note 68).  
 128 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 (1981). 
 129 17 Ind 29 (1861). 
 130 Id at 30. 
 131 Id at 32. 
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was not actually supported by consideration, makes sense from 
an empowerment perspective, because the promisor had no em-
powerment interests at stake in the legal enforcement of this 
promise. She was not really trying to induce the transfer of the 
penny, and that defect could not be cured either by the mere for-
mality of stating (falsely) that consideration existed or by the at-
tachment of unsought “consideration” to her promise of a gift.132 
More generally, when promisors try to get around the con-
sideration requirement with nominal consideration or false 
statements of consideration, they are trying to make their sub-
jective wills legally effective through contract law. Parties can 
often achieve this result through other legal mechanisms—such 
as through direct alienations of their property or through trusts 
and estates.133 Contract as empowerment nevertheless interprets 
contract law to be about empowerment, in the technical sense 
developed here, and not mere deference to the subjective will. 
Contract as empowerment thus explains why contract law gen-
erally cannot be used in this way, even if other legal mecha-
nisms can.134 The current theory also helps to explain why the 
consideration requirement is specific to contract law and why 
these other legal mechanisms typically lack the requirement.135 
 
 132 See, for example, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71, comment b, illustra-
tion 5 (1981):  
A desires to make a binding promise to give $1000 to his son B. Being advised 
that a gratuitous promise is not binding, A offers to buy from B for $1000 a 
book worth less than $1. B accepts the offer knowing that the purchase of the 
book is a mere pretense. There is no consideration for A’s promise to pay 
$1000. 
 133 See Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 10.1 
(2001) (“The controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a donative docu-
ment is the donor’s intention.”). I do not mean to suggest that property is or should al-
ways be alienable through these or other means. For a classic and brilliant discussion of 
when property should be market inalienable (that is, inalienable through contract law or 
market mechanisms, but potentially alienable through other mechanisms like gifts, 
trusts, or estates), see generally Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv 
L Rev 1849 (1987). 
 134 See, for example, Restatement (Second) of Property: Donative Transfers § 31.1 
(1992) (“The owner of personal property may make a gift thereof to another person (the 
donee) by delivering it to the donee, or to a third person for the donee, with the manifest-
ed intention that the donee be the owner of the personal property.”). 
 135 Restatement (Second) of Property: Donative Transfers § 31.1 (1992) (stating that 
“[a]cceptance by the donee of the gift is required for completion of the gift,” but not re-
quiring consideration); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 17(2) (2003): 
Except as provided in § 19, a trust is created by a will if the intention to create 
the trust and other elements essential to the creation of a testamentary trust (or-
dinarily, identification of the trust property, the beneficiaries, and the purposes 
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In addition, because the consideration requirement distin-
guishes promises in which empowerment interests are at stake 
from other classes of promises, contract as empowerment also 
recommends giving true contracts the specific type of legally en-
forceability needed for empowerment. Part III.A describes what 
this recommendation involves. Hence, the present account of 
consideration can now be harmonized with those earlier ac-
counts of the standard remedies.  
In particular, the authority to enforce promises that are 
supported by consideration through the law should typically be 
limited to contracting parties and should not be extended to 
third parties or to the state. True contracting parties should also 
have the legal right to demand something more than reliance 
damages but less than punitive damages. The “Goldilocks” rem-
edy—or the remedy that is “just right” for empowerment in the 
typical case—is expectation damages (with some minor excep-
tions that allow for specific performance). The legal right to 
these standard contractual remedies should not depend on the 
existence of any reliance harms, so long as a return promise or 
performance has been induced. 
Hence, quite a lot follows from the fact that a promise is 
supported by consideration. Notice, moreover, that application of 
these remedial rules follows from the fact that they promote con-
tracting parties’ empowerment interests and not from the fact 
that the parties subjectively chose them. On the current view, 
the existence of consideration establishes that empowerment in-
terests are at stake, and that fact explains the structure of 
standard contract remedies. Contract as empowerment thus ex-
plains why both the consideration requirement and these reme-
dial rules are mandatory rules, or rules that cannot be contract-
ed around—even though it is generally empowering to give 
parties great freedom to choose whether to contract, with whom, 
and on what terms. 
When promises are not supported by consideration, there is, 
on the other hand, either no return promise or no performance 
that a promisor sought to induce by making a legally enforceable 
promise, or the promisor has failed to influence any such action 
 
of the trust) can be ascertained from (a) the will itself; or (b) an existing in-
strument properly incorporated by reference into the will; or (c) facts referred 
to in the will that have significance apart from their effect upon the disposition 
of the property bequeathed or devised by the will. 
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by making a legally enforceable promise.136 Hence, there are no 
empowerment-related grounds to prevent people who make 
promises of these other kinds from reasonably rejecting a rule 
that gives their promisees the legal right to demand compliance. 
There may, of course, still be alternative grounds to enforce 
some of these other classes of promises.137 Nothing about con-
tract as empowerment rules out that possibility. To the extent 
that these other promises lack consideration, however, there is 
no reason to think that these other promises should be given the 
special type of legal enforceability needed for empowerment. The 
remedial rules connected with these other promises should 
therefore be different, and it is better to distinguish these other 
classes of legally enforceable promises from what I am calling 
“true contracts.” 
The most important example of this lies in the law of prom-
issory estoppel. Sometimes, parties bring claims for promissory 
estoppel that are really disguised claims for breach of a true con-
tract because consideration really does exist. In those cases, all 
of the empowerment-based arguments concerning the appropri-
ate shape of contract law should therefore apply to claims for 
promissory estoppel and expectation damages will be appropri-
ate, on the present account. For cases in which there is no con-
sideration, however, the only rationale for promissory estoppel is 
reliance based (and not empowerment based). There are, in fact, 
well-developed contractualist arguments that suggest that no 
one could reasonably reject a legal rule requiring compensation 
for harms caused by the breach of various duties, including 
promissory breaches.138 Hence, the appropriate remedy for prom-
issory estoppel in these circumstances should be reliance damag-
es. Contract as empowerment does not reject these arguments. It 
does, however, reject the view that promissory estoppel claims of 
this latter kind are fundamentally contractual in nature. 
C. Freedom of Contract and Market Regulation 
The third major puzzle for contract theory relates to the 
law’s inconsistent treatment of parties’ subjective contracting 
choices. On the one hand, contract law shows great deference to 
 
 136 This follows from the standard definition of consideration. See Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts § 71 (1981). 
 137 See, for example, Nancy S. Kim, Wrap Contracts: Foundations and Ramifications 
6–16 (Oxford 2013) (describing various theories for why contracts should be enforced). 
 138 See Scanlon, Promises and Contracts at 105–11 (cited in note 116). 
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parties’ subjective choices when determining the existence and 
scope of contractual obligations.139 Contract law also gives par-
ties great freedom to choose who their contracting parties will 
be. These freedoms are central enough to contract law that they 
are colloquially referred to as “freedom of contract.”140 On the 
other hand, contract law contains numerous doctrines that ei-
ther invite or require courts to deviate from parties’ subjective 
choices when determining the existence or scope of contracts.141 
Doctrines that fall into this latter category sometimes meet with 
the objection that they undermine freedom of contract.142 
If contract law’s primary purpose is to promote freedom of 
subjective choice, then doctrines that limit subjective choice are 
indeed incompatible with the fundamental principles of con-
tract.143 Doctrines like these represent alien intrusions into con-
tract law’s core subject matter and deviations from the funda-
mental principles that animate modern market activity.144 But if 
contract is about empowerment, rather than subjective choice, 
 
 139 See, for example, Benson, The Unity of Contract Law at 131 (cited in note 3); 
Katz, Book Review, 81 U Chi L Rev at 2046 (cited in note 99) (“The key feature of con-
tract law, as opposed to the other standard first-year subjects, is that it affords private 
parties the power of lawmaking. Contractual obligations are primarily created by decen-
tralized nonstate actors pursuing their own goals and plans.”); Elizabeth Anderson, The 
Ethical Limitations of the Market, 6 Econ & Phil 179, 180 (1990) (“The most important 
ideal that the modern market attempts to embody is a particular conception of free-
dom.”); G.H.L. Fridman, Freedom of Contract, 2 Ottawa L Rev 1, 1 (1967) (“One of the 
fundamental dogmas of the law is that everyone is free to contract as he wishes, as long 
as no illegality is involved.”); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts 
about Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum L Rev 629, 630 (1943) (“[F]reedom of contract does 
not commend itself for moral reasons only; it is also an eminently practical principle. It 
is the inevitable counterpart of a free enterprise system.”). 
 140 See Benson, The Unity of Contract Law at 198–99 (cited in note 3).  
 141 See, for example, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1981) (stating the 
unconscionability doctrine); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201 (1981) (presenting 
the modified objective approach to interpretation); Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 205 (1981) (“Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing in its performance and its enforcement.”); Schwartz and Scott, 113 Yale L J at 619 
(cited in note 1) (discussing the growth of mandatory rules in modern contract law). See 
also Kronman, 89 Yale L J at 472–511 (cited in note 58) (describing numerous limita-
tions on contracting that arise to promote public policy or substantive fairness). 
 142 See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternal-
ism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U Chi L Rev 1159, 1160 (2003) (“According to the conven-
tional wisdom, libertarians cannot possibly embrace paternalism, and paternalists abhor 
libertarianism.”); Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J L 
& Econ 293, 293–95 (1975). 
 143 See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U Chi 
L Rev 947, 947 (1984) (viewing “government regulation” as in “persistent tension” with 
“private ordering”). 
 144 See, for example, id. 
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then the story is more complex. This Section argues that con-
tract as empowerment offers a general framework that can be 
used to harmonize many of the doctrinal tensions that fall into 
this third category. Application of this framework will suggest 
that many perceived inconsistencies among these doctrines are 
not real. 
Four main areas of tension stand out with respect to free-
dom of contract. First, although contract law shows great defer-
ence to parties’ subjective contracting choices through its focus 
on parties’ mutual assent, it interprets this mutual assent using 
a modified objective (and not a purely subjective) test for in-
tent.145 In practice, this means that parties are often bound by 
contractual obligations that do not perfectly reflect their subjec-
tive wills. Second, contract law makes concessions to a broad 
range of public policies that limit freedom of contract.146 Third, 
contract law contains doctrines that invite or require courts to 
police bargains for contractual fairness at times—as exemplified 
most clearly in the modern unconscionability doctrine.147 Fourth, 
as I have already described, contract law contains a number of 
mandatory rules, which govern remedies and the consideration 
requirement—among other things.148 
1. Freedom of contract and subjective choice. 
Because freedom of contract reflects one side of all these 
tensions, it helps to explain the commitment to freedom of con-
tract first. For an empowerment theorist, this commitment is 
easy enough to explain. Contract law presumes that people can 
meet a broad range of human needs and interests if they are 
empowered to influence one another by making legally enforceable 
promises.149 This is because people reveal their preferences 
through voluntary choices and because there is some correlation 
between subjective-preference satisfaction and personal human 
 
 145 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 201–04 (1981) (providing principles for 
interpreting contracts, including the principle that when parties attach different mean-
ings to an agreement, it will be interpreted in accordance with the meaning of one party 
if the other party knew or had reason to know of the meaning attached by the former).  
 146 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 178–96 (1981). 
 147 See, for example, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1981) (providing that 
courts either can decline to enforce contracts that have unconscionable terms or can limit 
any unconscionable terms). 
 148 See Part III.A–B. 
 149 See Part I. 
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flourishing.150 These routes to human-preference satisfaction 
would, moreover, often be very difficult or impossible for a cen-
tralized state planner to identify on its own.151 Contracts and 
modern markets therefore provide important and nonduplicative 
mechanisms through which people can better achieve many of 
their highly varied personal ends. This can help people achieve 
better lives for themselves. 
Through contracting, people can also seek to achieve their 
personal ends in a context in which they do not have to explain 
or justify their decisions to others.152 In contract law, one typical-
ly promotes one’s conception of the good life through either 
choice or “exit” (that is, through decisions to contract for certain 
items or to not contract at all) rather than “voice” (that is, 
through reasoned deliberation over the good with others).153 Con-
tract laws that are empowering can thus embody one important 
conception of freedom: the freedom to pursue one’s personal 
wants, free from the obligation to justify them to others. To be 
empowering in these ways, contract law must, however, give 
private parties a great degree of latitude to subjectively decide 
whether to contract, with whom, and on what terms. The free-
dom to choose the terms of one’s contracts can also be empower-
ing, because it allows one to choose the level of induction that 
one seeks to employ in order to influence others’ actions.154 Con-
tract as empowerment thus recommends a set of rules that gives 
 
 150 For the classic early statement of the “revealed preferences” approach to measur-
ing utility, see generally P.A. Samuelson, A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer’s Be-
haviour, 5 Economica 61 (1938). I do not believe that human flourishing is equivalent to 
subjective-preference satisfaction, for reasons elaborated in, for example, Amartya Sen, 
Internal Consistency of Choice, 61 Econometrica 495, 498–504 (1993). But there is no 
doubt that some connection exists in many circumstances. 
 151 See Hayek, 35 Am Econ Rev at 524 (cited in note 97).  
 152 See, for example, Anderson, 6 Econ & Phil at 180–81 (cited in note 139):  
On this view [of freedom as embodied in modern markets], freedom is primari-
ly exercised in the choice and consumption of commodities in private life. It 
consists in having a large menu of choices in the marketplace and in exclusive 
power to use and dispose of things and services in the private sphere without 
having to ask permission from anyone else. 
See also Epstein, 18 J L & Econ at 293 (cited in note 142) (“One of the first functions of 
the law is to guarantee to individuals a sphere of influence in which they will be able to 
operate, without having to justify themselves to the state or to third parties.”). 
 153 Anderson, 6 Econ & Phil at 183–84 (cited in note 139) (describing economic goods 
as goods whose values are best realized through market transactions, in which “exit” ra-
ther than “voice” is the primary mechanism of influence). See also generally Albert O. 
Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and 
States (Harvard 1970). 
 154 See Part III.A.2. 
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parties’ subjective choices a central role in determining the ex-
istence and scope of their contractual obligations. 
Contract as empowerment is not unique in this regard. In 
fact, all leading theories of contract provide some explanation of 
contract law’s commitment to freedom of contract. For autonomy 
theorists like Kant, contract enforcement is justified by respect 
for autonomous choice.155 For promise-based theorists like Fried, 
who I view as differing in important essentials from Kant, con-
tract enforcement is conditioned on the existence of a voluntary 
promise.156 For reliance-based theorists like Professor Patrick 
Atiyah, only voluntary promises that are relied on should give 
rise to contractual liability.157 For neo-Aristotelian theorists like 
Professor James Gordley, the capacity for free choice is viewed as 
having a particular natural function (that is to say, it aims at hu-
man flourishing), but some exercise of this capacity is still needed 
to form a contract.158 And for people who would root contractual li-
ability in the logic of property transfer, like Professor Benson, a 
transfer must still be voluntary to be legally recognized.159 
In fact, voluntary choice even plays a key role in the central 
economic justification for contract enforcement. This is because 
economists view voluntary choice as revealing preferences. Vol-
untary agreements should therefore produce information about 
the routes to mutual preference satisfaction, and contract en-
forcement should promote efficiency. To this basic argument, 
economists often add an important Hayekian insight: this in-
formation about the routes to human-preference satisfaction, 
which is produced so easily and naturally by free negotiation, is 
often very difficult or impossible to produce through centralized 
state planning.160 Hence, all of the predominant contract theories 
offer patterns of justification for contract enforcement that apply 
best—or at least most directly—to terms that are both subjec-
tively and voluntarily chosen.161 
 
 155 See Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy 
34–45 (Harvard 2009). 
 156 Fried, Contract as Promise at 1 (cited in note 37). 
 157 P.S. Atiyah, Promises, Morals, and Law 123–29 (Oxford rev ed 1983). 
 158 James Gordley, Morality and Contract: The Question of Paternalism, 48 Wm & 
Mary L Rev 1733, 1759 (2007). 
 159 Benson, The Unity of Contract Law at 131 (cited in note 3). 
 160 I explain this in Robin Kar, The Challenge of Boilerplate (Jotwell, Sept 3, 2013), 
archived at http://perma.cc/9QEP-TG5X. 
 161 See id. This point has also been emphasized in Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate: 
The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law 55–81 (Princeton 2013). 
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The real question for contract theory is not how to explain 
contract law’s commitment to freedom of contract. Rather, it is 
how to explain this commitment in a way that does not make it 
impossible to interpret a number of other doctrinal facts, which 
seem to limit subjective choice, in a coherent manner. The fol-
lowing Section argues that contract as empowerment’s account 
of freedom of contract is consistent with an equally useful ac-
count of many of the ways in which contract law deviates from 
pure deference to parties’ subjective intentions when determin-
ing the existence or scope of contractual obligations. The fact 
that contract as empowerment harmonizes not only all of these 
doctrinal facts but also the features of remedies and the consid-
eration requirement discussed in earlier sections suggests that 
the current theory has important interpretive advantages over 
the alternatives. 
2. Freedom of contract and deviations from subjective 
intent. 
Let us begin with the modified objective approach to inter-
pretation.162 The fact that courts take this approach can be puz-
zling because—as noted above—all of the predominant contract 
theories offer central patterns of justification that ground con-
tract enforcement in features of parties’ free choices.163 As Pro-
fessor Margaret Jane Radin has observed, the concept of free 
choice that is presupposed in these theories “has a subjective ba-
sis”: it is rooted in an ideal of free will that “is not a matter of 
community acquiescence and is not understood as dependent on 
community attribution.”164 Courts nevertheless determine the 
content of contractual obligations based not simply on parties’ sub-
jective choices but in part on what a reasonable person would take 
the parties’ words to mean in context. This “modified objective” 
approach to interpretation thus “causes a fissure in contract theo-
ry, roughly between internal and external views of intention.”165 
As Radin notes, “this fissure has been known to contracts 
theorists,” but “it has been latent.”166 Its problematic nature has 
not, in other words, been sufficiently acknowledged or ad-
dressed. It creates a major problem of fit between theory and 
 
 162 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201(2) (1981). 
 163 See Part III.C.1. 
 164 Radin, Boilerplate at 89 (cited in note 161). 
 165 Id at 90. 
 166 Id.  
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doctrine, because objective approaches to interpretation are in-
consistent with the normative foundations of contract law—at 
least as expressed in the standard theories.167 This is because—
as Radin notes—the standard theories offer normative justifica-
tions of contract that rely on features of parties’ subjective in-
tentions, whereas, on her construal of the existing literature, ob-
jective tests rely on an objective theory of language and 
communication.168 
Contract as empowerment offers a different view of the mod-
ified objective approach to interpretation. If contract is about 
empowerment, then contract law should show great deference to 
parties’ subjective choices about when to contract, with whom, 
and on what terms. This deference is, however, explained in 
terms of parties’ empowerment interests and not directly in terms 
of their subjective choices. If promisors want to influence other 
people’s actions by making legally enforceable promises, then 
they have empowerment-related reasons to accept legal rules that 
permit promisees to rely on the most reasonable interpretations 
of their words. Otherwise, promisors could get out of their con-
tracts any time that they attached different subjective meanings 
to their terms. Hence, promisees would be unable to trust con-
tracts, and promisors would be unable to use them as effective 
tools to influence action. Hence, the very same empowerment in-
terests that I use to explain freedom of contract can be used to 
explain why courts should take an objective approach to inter-
pretation. Contract as empowerment addresses the fissure iden-
tified by Radin. 
But how objective should interpretation be? The point of us-
ing an objective test, on the present view, is not to promote ob-
jectivity for its own sake but rather to promote empowerment. 
Empowerment interests inevitably manifest themselves in par-
ticular interpersonal contexts. Different industry conventions 
and particular shared understandings between the parties can 
therefore affect the reasonable interpretations that parties at-
tach to contract terms in real contexts.169 Given these facts, does 
contract as empowerment recommend attaching completely ob-
jective and context-independent meanings to contracts, even if 
those meanings differ from both parties’ understandings? 
 
 167 See id. 
 168 Radin, Boilerplate at 89 (cited in note 161).  
 169 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201, comments a–b (1981). 
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It does not. Contract as empowerment recognizes that par-
ties negotiate contracts in highly particularized bargaining con-
texts. It also recognizes that promises can influence people in 
the real world only through promisees’ subjective understand-
ings of contract terms. Hence, when the parties to a contract 
share the same understanding of a term, however idiosyncratic, 
neither party can reasonably reject a legal rule that binds both 
parties to that understanding. Being bound by this understand-
ing is all that is needed for empowerment, and it would not be 
additionally empowering (and might even be disempowering) to 
be bound by something else. 
Under the modified objective approach to interpretation, 
courts do, in fact, defer to shared interpretations like this. 
Courts seek a more objective interpretation only when parties 
attach different subjective meanings to a disputed term.170 
Even in cases of dispute, moreover, courts do not simply ask 
what the most objective interpretation is, wholly devoid of con-
text. They ask, instead, whether one party knew or should have 
known about the other party’s subjective interpretation, while 
the second party neither knew nor should have known about 
that of the first party.171 In practice, this so-called “modified” ob-
jective approach to interpretation favors whichever party’s view 
was more reasonable under the circumstances, given the entire 
context of the trade, the course of negotiations, and the commu-
nications between the parties.172 This is thus a type of objective 
interpretation, but only in the sense that it favors one party’s 
subjective understanding over another’s. Courts never attach ob-
jective meanings to contracts that neither party subjectively un-
derstood or fathomed.173 
These doctrinal nuances can be puzzling—even for some 
who favor objective approaches to interpretation in the abstract. 
These nuances make sense, however, from an empowerment 
perspective. For reasons explained here, promises can influence 
people in real-world settings only through promisees’ subjective 
 
 170 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201 (1981). 
 171 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(1) (1981) (“Words and other conduct 
are interpreted in the light of all the circumstances, and if the principal purpose of the 
parties is ascertainable it is given great weight.”); Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 202, comment b (1981) (“When the parties have adopted a writing as a final expression 
of their agreement, interpretation is directed to the meaning of that writing in the light 
of the circumstances.”). 
 172 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202 & comment b (1981). 
 173 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201 (1981). 
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understandings of their terms. Empowerment interests can there-
fore justify holding promisors to reasonable interpretations that 
promisees rely on but not to anything more objective than that. In 
practice, this rule will sometimes favor one party and sometimes 
another—but it cannot systematically favor any reasonable party. 
Hence, neither party to an actual contract can reasonably reject a 
modified objective approach to interpretation.174 
A second major source of tension with freedom of contract 
arises from a diverse set of public policies that limit contractual 
liberty in various ways. Sometimes these limitations are explic-
itly endorsed from within the general law of contracts. The de-
fenses of illegality and public policy provide the clearest exam-
ples,175 though it should be noted that these defenses typically 
incorporate by reference laws or policies that arise from a wide 
array of noncontractual sources.176 Other public policy limita-
tions appear in the form of regulations that govern certain spe-
cialized bodies of transactional law, such as those relating to la-
bor;177 finance;178 intellectual property;179 or food, drugs, and 
health.180 Finally, even without the explicit endorsement of any 
body of transactional law, public policy limitations can arise 
from other sources that interact with contract law in ways that 
either limit or appear to limit freedom of contract. Some particu-
larly prominent examples include laws relating to taxation (es-
pecially for redistributive purposes),181 social security,182 and 
 
 174 Another way to put this point is to say that the modified objective approach to 
interpretation is more empowering than both purely objective approaches and purely 
subjective approaches. With respect to purely subjective approaches, it would be signifi-
cantly disempowering to require a perfect (subjective) meeting of the minds for contract 
formation. Agreements of this kind rarely exist in practice, and this alternative rule 
would therefore disempower people by making almost all contracts unenforceable. 
 175 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178 (1981). 
 176 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178 & comment a (1981). 
 177 See generally, for example, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat 1060, codi-
fied as amended at 29 USC § 201 et seq. 
 178 See, for example, Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010”), Pub L No 
111-203, 124 Stat 1376, 1802–22, codified at 12 USC §§ 5461–72. 
 179 See, for example, 17 USC § 501 (establishing remedies for copyright infringement).  
 180 See generally, for example, Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat 1040 
(1938), codified as amended at 21 USC § 301 et seq. 
 181 See, for example, 26 USC § 1(a)–(d) (setting forth a progressive individual in-
come tax). 
 182 See generally, for example, Social Security Act, 49 Stat 620 (1935), codified as 
amended at 42 USC § 301 et seq. 
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universal health care183—all of which limit the subjective choices 
that people can make regarding how to dispose of their pretax 
income. 
Because the public policies that limit freedom of contract 
have so many sources, this class of tensions is incredibly diverse. 
It is beyond the scope of an article like this one to discuss each 
individually. Contract as empowerment nevertheless offers a 
distinctive framework for deciding when public policy limita-
tions are and are not consistent with the fundamental principles 
of contract. 
Contract as empowerment does this by interpreting contract 
as empowerment while explaining the legally obligating force of 
contracts in terms of a more general theory of obligation. This 
more general, “contractualist” theory of obligation independently 
rules out some actions and forms of interpersonal influence.184 It 
therefore prohibits the use of contracts to promote those actions 
or engage in those influences. Prohibitions like these are not in-
consistent with interpreting contract as empowerment, because 
they presume it would be empowering to treat these contracts as 
legally enforceable instruments. They cite this fact, along with 
the fact that these contracts promote prohibited ends, as reasons 
not to treat these contracts as genuinely legally obligating. 
To take a very simple and uncontroversial example, consid-
er a contract for murder. If a person were to try to induce some-
one to murder a third party by making a legally enforceable 
promise to pay, then the promising party could not reasonably 
reject a legal rule that gave this promisee the legal right to de-
mand the payment. That much follows from the basic account of 
contract as empowerment.185 Still, potential murder victims—
who are the relevant third parties in cases like these—could 
reasonably reject any system of rules that permits murder.186 
 
 183 See, for example, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 1101–03, Pub L 
No 111-148, 124 Stat 119, 141–46 (2010), codified at 42 USC §§ 18001–03. 
 184 See, for example, Darwall, Introduction at 4–7 (cited in note 26) (arguing that 
common illegal acts are inconsistent with treating others as moral equals); Rawls, 77 J 
Phil at 515 (cited in note 31). See also T.M. Scanlon and Johnathan Dancy, Intention and 
Permissibility, 74 Proceedings Aristotelian Socy Supp Vol 301, 313 (2000) (suggesting 
that an action like murder is inconsistent with treating another person as possessing a 
form of personal authority over his or her own life that cannot be reasonably rejected). 
 185 See Part I. 
 186 See Scanlon and Dancy, 74 Proceedings Aristotelian Socy Supp Vol at 313 (cited 
in note 184) (arguing that intentional killing is “inconsistent with the idea that each per-
son has a special claim to and authority over his or her own life and body, an idea which 
[the authors] take to be itself one that no one could reasonably reject”).  
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They could therefore reasonably reject any system of rules that 
empowers people to induce murders by making legally enforceable 
promises. It follows that promises like these should be deemed 
void (as they in fact are under the law187), regardless of whether 
they promote the contracting parties’ subjective preferences. In 
cases like these, the same form of justification that explains why 
contracts should sometimes be enforced on empowerment-related 
grounds explains why contracts that seek to induce certain wrong-
ful actions, like murder, should be deemed void and unenforceable. 
This application of the illegality defense limits parties’ free-
dom of contract in an uncontroversial way. Still, contract as em-
powerment offers a distinctive interpretation of this limitation. 
It suggests that there is no genuine incompatibility between the 
normative foundations of contract and this limitation on free-
dom of contract. In fact, even if a legally enforceable contract for 
murder would produce more subjective-preference satisfaction 
for two contracting parties than perceived costs to a particular 
murder victim (who may, for example, value his or her life very 
little during a bout of depression), the contract could not be gen-
uinely legally obligating on the present account. Contract as 
empowerment offers a different justification for limitations like 
these than economic accounts that seek to reduce all justifica-
tions to questions of overall or average subjective-preference 
maximization.188 
Although it goes beyond the scope of this Article to discuss 
which public policy limitations are warranted by this approach, 
there is a large secondary literature on what contractualist ac-
counts of obligation require.189 Contract as empowerment sug-
gests that it is this literature, and the questions pursued there-
in, that should be consulted to determine when public policy 
limitations are consistent with the normative foundations of 
contract. This approach can be used to test a broad range of pub-
lic policy limitations, including prohibitions against contracting 
 
 187 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178 (1981). 
 188 Of course, the most sophisticated economists do not fall into this camp. See, for 
example, Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 35 (Wolters Kluwer 8th ed 2011) 
(“[T]here is more to justice than economics, and this is a point the reader should keep in 
mind in evaluating normative statements in this book.”). I thank Professor Bix for re-
minding me of this point. 
 189 See generally, for example, Gerald Gaus, The Order of Public Reason: A Theory 
of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World (Cambridge 2011); Jean 
Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (Cambridge 1986). See also Rawls, 
A Theory of Justice at 130–36 (cited in note 27). 
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into slavery,190 minimum wage laws,191 laws governing prostitu-
tion,192 and regulations of sales of various legal and illegal 
drugs.193 If limitations like these prevent people from inducing 
others to act in ways that are prohibited by rules that no one 
could reasonably reject, then they are fully consistent with the 
normative foundations of contract and the basic principles of the 
modern marketplace on the current view.194 
I turn, finally, to doctrines that invite or require courts to 
police bargains for contractual fairness. By “contractual fair-
ness,” I mean something specific. I mean to refer to a form of in-
terpersonal fairness that arises between specific contracting par-
ties and within specific contractual relations. This should 
therefore be distinguished from fairness in the overall distribu-
tion of benefits and burdens among members of a society—or 
what is properly referred to as “distributive justice.”195 Contrac-
tual fairness is independent of distributive justice in this sense, 
and it is instead concerned with the extent to which specific con-
tracting parties treat one another fairly. It is therefore useful to 
separate doctrines that reflect concerns for contractual fairness 
from doctrines that reflect concerns for public policy (including 
concerns for distributive justice). 
The modern unconscionability doctrine is clearly concerned 
with contractual fairness—at least in part.196 There are, howev-
er, many other examples of this concern in modern contract law. 
One is the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, because 
 
 190 US Const Amend XIII, § 1. 
 191 See, for example, 29 USC § 206. 
 192 See, for example, 18 USC § 2422. For a good discussion of some of the values that 
are at stake in laws that regulate prostitution, see Radin, 100 Harv L Rev at 1921–25 
(cited in note 133). 
 193 See, for example, 42 USC § 12210; 41 CFR § 60-741.24.  
 194 I am not arguing here that any particular public policy limitations meet this cri-
terion. That would take another article or a series of articles. 
 195 Here, I am agreeing with Professor Arnold F. McKee that people sometimes use the 
terms “distributive” or “social” justice to encompass three distinct forms of justice: social 
justice, distributive justice properly so-called, and the justice of exchange. See Arnold F. 
McKee, What Is “Distributive” Justice?, 39 Rev Soc Econ 1, 1 (1981). Distributive jus-
tice—in the sense of a fair distribution of burdens and benefits within a society among 
all its members—nevertheless differs from the justice or fairness of individual exchang-
es. I therefore agree with McKee that “the concept of distributive justice is [ ] best re-
served for its old sense of sharing out community benefits and burdens to individual 
members.” Id. In any event, I use the term “distributive justice” in this restricted sense 
here, and I distinguish it from contractual fairness. 
 196 However, the doctrine may also be concerned with more. For example, Professor 
Anthony Kronman clearly views it as concerned at least in part with distributive justice. 
Kronman, 89 Yale L J at 474 (cited in note 58). 
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this duty essentially prevents parties from exploiting one anoth-
er in unfair ways once having formed a contract.197 Another ex-
ample relates to the standard tests for partial, material, and to-
tal breach.198 These rules determine what levels of response are 
warranted by different classes of breach. As a practical matter, 
these rules, which cannot be contracted around, work to ensure 
that parties respond fairly—in the sense of proportionally—to 
one another’s lapses in performance.199 Yet another example re-
lates to the different ways that contract law treats different uni-
lateral modifications of contracts. In particular, courts will allow 
some unilateral modifications when circumstances change in 
ways that alter the fundamental nature of a transaction, so long 
as the modifications are “fair.”200 Under the preexisting duty 
rule, however, courts will not allow parties to force unilateral 
modifications in unfair or exploitative ways.201 There are also 
numerous statutory regimes that regulate specific markets for 
contractual fairness in more-particularized settings. Some ex-
amples include consumer-protection statutes,202 certain financial 
and banking regulations,203 and aspects of labor law.204 
 
 197 See UCC § 2-103 (ALI 2012) (defining good faith for merchants as “honesty in 
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade”); 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, comment a (1981) (“Good faith performance or 
enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and 
consistency with the justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of 
types of conduct characterized as involving ‘bad faith’ because they violate community 
standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.”). 
 198 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 241–42 (1981) (setting forth a test to 
distinguish material breaches from partial breaches). 
 199 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 235–44 (1981) (setting forth factors for 
evaluating failures to perform and allowing corresponding responses by nonbreaching 
parties). 
 200 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 261–72 (1981). 
 201 Compare Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 261–72 (1981) (allowing the uni-
lateral discharge of duties on the grounds of impracticability or frustration), with Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts §§ 273–77 (1981) (requiring consideration or a substi-
tute to discharge duties with the assent of the obligee).  
 202 See generally, for example, Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub L No 91-508, 84 Stat 
1128 (1970), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1681 et seq; Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act, Pub L No 95-109, 91 Stat 874 (1977), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1692 et seq. 
See also UCC § 2A-104(1)(c) (ALI 2012) (stating that leases are subject to state consumer-
protection laws). 
 203 See generally, for example, Truth in Lending Act, Pub L No 90-321, 82 Stat 146 
(1968), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1601 et seq. See also Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act § 503, Pub L No 93-495, 88 Stat 1521–22 (1974), codified as amended at 15 USC 
§ 1691. 
 204 See, for example, Daniel Morton-Bentley, Two Guiding Trends in Contemporary 
Labor and Employment Law: Technology and Fairness (The Federalist Society, Dec 9, 
2011), archived at http://perma.cc/5P5K-AZTE (observing that one of the “two primary 
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Contract as empowerment offers a distinctive framework to 
determine when doctrines that invite or require courts to police 
bargains for contractual fairness reflect direct expressions of the 
fundamental principles of contract. To understand this frame-
work, it helps to ask when contract law should endorse legal 
doctrines that either invite or require courts to police bargains 
for substantive fairness, as reflected most clearly in the modern 
unconscionability doctrine. The two most extreme views on this 
topic are that contracts should never be policed for substantive 
fairness (a view that is popular on the economic right)205 and 
that contracts should always be policed for substantive fairness 
(a view that is sometimes voiced on the economic left).206 Con-
tract as empowerment rejects both of these views, but its ap-
proach to this question depends on what it means for courts to 
police bargains for substantive fairness. The remainder of this 
Section explores how judgments of substantive contractual un-
fairness might be made. It describes and rejects one approach 
and then recommends another as consistent with contract as 
empowerment. 
Hence, consider a system of rules that invite or require 
courts to reform all contractual terms based on their own senses 
of what fair exchange is. Courts would thus substitute their own 
conceptions of fairness for the parties’ agreed-upon terms in all 
cases, thereby making the parties’ intents wholly irrelevant to 
the remedies available for breaches of contract. Under these 
rules, parties would be unable to fashion the level and type of 
inducement that they desire when contracting. These rules 
would thus be significantly disempowering and would make it 
much harder for parties to use contracts to obtain broad ranges 
of goods or services. In addition, without some reliable method 
 
trends guiding contemporary labor and employment law” is “increased fairness measures 
at the expense of legal certainty”).  
 205 See, for example, Epstein, 18 J L & Econ at 304 (cited in note 142) (“[C]ourts 
should then enforce [contractual] transactions in accordance with the general principles 
of contract law, without any resort to unconscionability doctrines, and without any inde-
pendent examination of the ‘fairness’ of the agreement’s substantive terms.”). 
 206 I say “sometimes” because it is rare to find people who believe that contracts 
should always be set aside in favor of courts’ views on the substantive fairness of an ex-
change. Some on the economic left nevertheless believe that there should be more, not 
less, room for doctrines like unconscionability. See, for example, Kronman, 89 Yale L J at 
510 (cited in note 58) (arguing that “contractual regulation will on occasion be the least 
intrusive and most efficient way of redistributing wealth to those who have a legitimate 
claim to a larger share of society’s resources”). 
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to measure whether contracts are substantively fair,207 it is not 
clear that these rules would ensure either fair exchanges or ex-
changes that are perceived as fair by the relevant parties.208 
When determining whether promisors could reasonably re-
ject these legal rules, one must therefore weigh the rules’ ex-
pected costs and benefits to particular promisors and compare 
these rules to the alternatives. One must also consider the costs 
of error in light of the epistemic challenges that these rules cre-
ate with respect to courts’ abilities to identify exchanges that are 
both mutually beneficial and fair.209 If the only choices were 
rules that always policed bargains for substantive fairness, 
based on courts’ intuitions of fairness, and rules that never did, 
then no one could reasonably reject the latter rules because the 
latter rules would be more empowering to all. The rules might 
not always be equally empowering and might allow for some 
substantively unfair exchanges. Still, these facts cannot be rea-
sonable grounds for rejecting these rules if the ideals of substan-
tive fairness and equal empowerment are unreachable in prac-
tice and if the only alternative legal rules would be 
disempowering—and hence harmful—to all.210 
There is, however, no reason to consider only the two most 
extreme views on this topic—namely, that courts should always 
or never police bargains for substantive fairness. Whether peo-
ple can reasonably reject a set of legal rules depends not only on 
the intrinsic features of the rules but also on what the alterna-
tives are. Because these are not the only alternatives, this can-
not be the end of the analysis. 
Hence, consider a set of rules that invite courts to use in-
formation produced by many private market exchanges as a 
metric to determine whether particular exchanges are likely to 
 
 207 With respect to this epistemic issue, Professor Richard Epstein has suggested, 
for example, that “[i]t is difficult to know what principles identify the ‘just term,’ and for 
the same reasons that make it so difficult to determine the ‘just price.’” Epstein, 18 J L 
& Econ at 306 (cited in note 142). 
 208 For reasons that Professor Friedrich Hayek has outlined, I believe that—absent 
robust private market activity—it is often difficult to identify exchanges that would be mu-
tually beneficial, let alone fair. See generally Hayek, 35 Am Econ Rev 519 (cited in note 97). 
 209 For further discussion of these challenges, see generally id. 
 210 Although the fact that a set of rules produces unfair allocations of goods and ser-
vices can provide a reasonable ground to reject these rules, that rejection will be reason-
able only if there is an alternative set of rules that is more fair and does not create too 
much additional harm to anyone.  
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be substantively fair.211 Rather than relying on courts’ own sens-
es of fairness to police contracts in all cases, parties would be 
free—under these rules—to bargain from a perspective of self-
interest in most cases, and courts would typically hold parties to 
their agreed-upon terms (as interpreted using a modified objec-
tive test).212 
When parties enter into contracts from relatively equal bar-
gaining positions, courts would view the resulting terms as espe-
cially good evidence of what a fair exchange is in similar cases. 
Courts would then use this information as a metric to test for the 
substantive fairness of other similar contracts—but only in certain 
exceptional circumstances, which I will describe momentarily.213 
The first point to recognize about these rules is that they 
would depend on courts’ deference to parties’ voluntary agree-
ments, as objectively construed, in the broad run of cases. It is 
largely by deferring to parties’ voluntary agreements in the 
broad run of cases that courts would obtain the information that 
is needed to police bargains for substantive fairness in certain 
exceptional cases. Hence, these rules would not be disempower-
ing to anyone in the broad run of cases. 
When parties enter into contracts from highly unequal bar-
gaining positions, however, courts would inquire further into 
their terms and test them against this metric for substantive 
fairness. Courts would ask whether these terms significantly de-
viated from those that the parties would have likely reached from 
a procedurally fair bargaining position. A court would invalidate 
 
 211 This method would thus employ, rather than undermine, information produced 
by private markets. Rather than failing to acknowledge Hayek’s important insights in 
The Use of Knowledge in Society, this method would take advantage of them. See gener-
ally Hayek, 35 Am Econ Rev 519 (cited in note 97). 
 212 I say a “modified objective test” rather than an “objective test” for the reasons 
explained in this Section. 
 213 To understand this proposal, one must understand what it means to say that two 
parties have entered into a contract from an “equal bargaining position.” I say that two 
parties have entered into a contract from a perfectly equal bargaining position if they 
have negotiated with perfectly equal capacities, perfectly equal access to knowledge of 
any facts relevant to the exchange, perfectly equal understandings of all of the relevant 
terms, perfectly equal capacities to modify all of the relevant terms, perfectly equal time 
and opportunity to deliberate, and perfectly equal access to the market. In addition, nei-
ther party can have induced the other to enter into the contract through misrepresenta-
tion, duress, undue influence, or manipulation of the other’s voluntary choices in ways 
that are likely to systematically disadvantage the other party. The parties must there-
fore be motivated solely by their equally reliable assessments of the expected costs, bene-
fits, and perceived market fairness (or fairness relative to other market possibilities) of 
the underlying exchange.  
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or reform a contract for substantive fairness only if there were 
sufficient evidence both of one party’s opportunity to take unfair 
advantage of the other party and of the realization of unfair 
terms in the contract.  
This idea roughly matches the orthodox “sliding scale” ap-
proach to unconscionability, which inquires into both procedural 
and substantive unconscionability but requires less evidence of 
one when there is more evidence of the other.214 Courts tend to 
find unconscionability only in exceptional cases and—with some 
exceptions—only when both types of unfairness are present in 
some form.215 
The question to ask is whether parties could reasonably re-
ject this second set of rules in favor of rules that never allow 
courts to police bargains for substantive fairness. The answer is 
no, so long as this second set of rules sufficiently preserves par-
ties’ empowerment interests while helping to ensure that con-
tract law is more equally empowering. The relevant rules must 
also be operational: the doctrines cannot seek to promote an ide-
al of substantive fairness that is unattainable in practice, and 
the costs of policing must be lower than the benefits of fair 
treatment to parties who might otherwise be treated unfairly. 
 
 214 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208, comment c (1981) (“[A] contract 
[may] be oppressive taken as a whole, even though there is no weakness in the bargain-
ing process and no single term which is in itself unconscionable.”); Samuel Williston, 8 A 
Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 18:10 at 111–14 (West 4th ed 2010) (Richard A. Lord, 
ed) (“Thus, the fairness of the bargaining procedure—and hence, whether there is proce-
dural unconscionability—may be of less importance if it results in harsh or unreasonable 
substantive terms, or substantive unconscionability may be sufficient in itself even 
though procedural unconscionability is not.”) (citation omitted); Philip L. Bruner and 
Patrick J. O’Connor Jr, 8 Bruner & O’Connor on Construction Law § 21:142 at 53–54 
(Thomson Reuters 2014) (“[A] number [of jurisdictions] have adopted a ‘sliding scale’ ap-
proach that permits a court to conclude an arbitration clause is unconscionable based on 
less evidence of either one of the two types of unconscionability as long as there is 
stronger than usual evidence of the other type of unconscionability.”). 
 215 On the exceptional use of unconscionability, see, for example, Sitogum Holdings, 
Inc v Ropes, 800 A2d 915, 916 (NJ Super Chanc Div 2002) (noting that “[t]he common 
law doctrine of unconscionability has proved difficult to define and has been rarely in-
voked undoubtedly because, other than in exceptional cases, it has largely been viewed 
as grossly interfering with the freedom to contract”). On the typical need for both proce-
dural and substantive unconscionability, see, for example, Bruner and O’Connor, Bruner 
& O’Connor on Construction Law at § 21:142 at 53–54 (cited in note 214) (“[M]ost juris-
dictions require a showing of both procedural and substantive unconscionability.”). But 
see Williston, 8 A Treatise on the Law of Contracts at § 18:10 at 115 (cited in note 214), 
quoting Maxwell v Fidelity Financial Services, Inc, 907 P2d 51, 59 (Ariz 1995) (“There-
fore, we conclude that under [UCC § 2-302], a claim of unconscionability can be estab-
lished with a showing of substantive unconscionability alone, especially in cases involv-
ing either price-cost disparity or limitation of remedies.”). 
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Contract as empowerment thus offers a general framework 
to determine when rules that invite or require courts to police 
bargains for substantive fairness are consistent with the norma-
tive foundations of contract. Although many theorists believe 
that these regulations reflect improper restrictions on freedom of 
contract,216 this framework suggests that they sometimes pro-
mote equal contractual empowerment—the only freedom of con-
tract that is capable of producing genuine legal obligations. On 
the current view, regulations like these are thus reflections of—
rather than alien intrusions into—the fundamental principles of 
contract and the modern market. It is also important to recog-
nize that this explanation does not depend on viewing contracts 
as mechanisms to promote distributive justice. Unlike contrac-
tual fairness, distributive justice may be better pursued through 
mechanisms like tax and transfer than through contract law. 
The present framework can, moreover, be plausibly used to 
explain a number of potentially puzzling features of modern con-
tract law. For example, it plausibly recommends a general in-
terpretive principle, which suggests filling gaps in incomplete 
contracts (and construing ambiguities in them) so as to approx-
imate the terms that the parties would have agreed to under cir-
cumstances of perfect procedural fairness.217 The present frame-
work also plausibly recommends subjecting certain classes of 
contracts, in which procedural inequalities are especially com-
mon, to special scrutiny for both substantive and procedural 
fairness. Some examples of laws that already do this include 
laws that govern fair-lending practices,218 consumer-protection 
statutes,219 the contra proferentem doctrine (which sometimes al-
lows courts to interpret contractual ambiguities against the 
 
 216 See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 147–48 (cited in note 188). See also 
Richard Craswell, Freedom of Contract, in Eric A. Posner, ed, Chicago Lectures in Law 
and Economics 81, 81 (Foundation 2000) (“Depending on one’s point of view, freedom of 
contract can be seen as a choice between individual liberty and heavy-handed govern-
ment control, or between communitarian consensus and the worst excesses of laissez-
faire capitalism.”). 
 217 Some economists have made similar recommendations. See, for example, Steven 
Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 301 (Belknap 2004) (“As a general 
matter, parties will want incomplete contracts to be interpreted as if they had spent the 
time and effort to specify more detailed terms.”). The present recommendation neverthe-
less specifies filling gaps in contracts not with the terms that the parties would have ac-
tually agreed to but with the terms they would have agreed to had they been bargaining 
from a position of perfect procedural fairness.  
 218 See, for example, 15 USC §§ 1601–67. 
 219 See, for example, Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 5.108 (Prentice-Hall 1968). 
 822  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:759 
   
dominant parties who draft contracts),220 the reasonable-
expectations doctrine (which applies primarily to insurance con-
tracts),221 the law of collective bargaining,222 employment dis-
crimination and minimum wage statutes,223 and a broad range of 
legal doctrines that invite special scrutiny for boilerplate and for 
contracts of adhesion.224 As noted, this general framework is also 
very close to the modern doctrine of unconscionability.225 
I do not, however, believe that current law perfectly reflects 
rules that promote equal empowerment (or deviate from this 
ideal only when no one could reasonably reject rules that are 
unequally empowering in light of the available alternatives). In 
my view, this problem is partly attributable to the absence of a 
plausible theory of contract that exhibits the appropriate rela-
tionship between doctrines that police bargains for fairness and 
the normative foundations of contract. But it is also partly at-
tributable to modern changes in the world, including the fact 
that contracts are increasingly formed with the use of boiler-
plate, which is rarely read or understood—especially in many 
consumer contexts.226 This is thus one of the areas in which the 
greatest amount of legal reform is warranted,227 and for which 
 
 220 See Charles L. Knapp, Nathan M. Crystal, and Harry G. Prince, Problems in 
Contract Law 357–58 (Wolters Kluwer 2007).  
 221 Id at 379–80 (explaining that, under the reasonable-expectations doctrine, the 
objectively reasonable expectations of policyholders will be honored even if a study of pol-
icy provisions shows that they would have negated those expectations). 
 222 See generally, for example, National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat 449 (1935), 
codified as amended at 29 USC § 151 et seq. 
 223 See, for example, Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241, 
255–57, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000e-2. 
 224 See Kessler, 43 Colum L Rev at 633 (cited in note 139) (“[O]ur common law of 
standardized contracts is highly contradictory and confusing, and the potentialities in-
herent in the common law system for coping with contracts of adhesion have not been 
fully developed.”). 
 225 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1981); UCC § 2-302 (ALI 2012); E. 
Allan Farnsworth and William F. Young, Cases and Materials on Contracts 386–454 
(Foundation 5th ed 1995). See also Burch v Second Judicial District Court of the State of 
Nevada, 49 P3d 647, 650 (Nev 2002) (“Generally, both procedural and substantive un-
conscionability must be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to 
enforce a contract or clause as unconscionable. . . . Because the procedural unconsciona-
bility in this case is so great, less evidence of substantive unconscionability is required to 
establish unconscionability.”). 
 226 See, for example, Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, More Than You 
Wanted to Know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosure 59–93 (Princeton 2014); Radin, 
Boilerplate at 197–216 (cited in note 161). See also Kar, The Challenge of Boilerplate 
(cited in note 160). 
 227 See, for example, Radin, Boilerplate at 243–48 (cited in note 161) (suggesting 
steps for NGOs, firms, regulatory agencies, courts, and lawyers). 
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contract as empowerment might be of greatest use. I hope to de-
velop some of these points in later applications of the theory. 
Still, as the above arguments collectively show, contract as 
empowerment offers a unified account of some of the most puz-
zling and seemingly inconsistent doctrines in modern contract 
law. The fact that contract as empowerment can harmonize all 
the core doctrines identified in Part II, while explaining the le-
gally obligatory force of contracts, suggests that the current theo-
ry has important interpretive advantages over other leading 
economic and philosophical theories of contract. 
IV.  OBJECTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
This Part now turns to three objections that one might raise 
to contract as empowerment. The first claims that the theory 
cannot offer a complete interpretive theory of contract because 
the theory has been shown to have only limited explanatory 
power. The second argues that even if contract as empowerment 
offers a complete interpretive theory, it is insufficiently distinct 
from economic theories to reflect a meaningful alternative. The 
third suggests that the theory should be rejected because it rests 
on a controversial normative foundation. 
A. Completeness of the Theory 
The first objection questions whether contract as empower-
ment offers a complete interpretive theory of contract. Even if it 
offers the best unified explanation of the three core areas of doc-
trine discussed in this Article, no attempt has been made to in-
terpret many other rules. 
This limitation is partly due to space, and partly due to my 
aim in this Article. My aim is to introduce the theory of contract 
as empowerment and establish that it has major interpretive ad-
vantages over leading economic and philosophical theories. As 
explained in Part II, the three areas of doctrines that I focus on 
here were therefore chosen very carefully. They collect some of 
the best-known puzzles about contract law, which largely define 
its core subject matter. The doctrines often have some mandatory 
status and have proved remarkably stable, in some form, in all 
common-law systems with advanced market economies.228 These 
doctrines also capture some of the deepest and most seemingly 
 
 228 See Part II. 
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irreconcilable tensions in modern contract law, such as those 
among fairness, liberty, and efficiency.229 Because contract as 
empowerment is uniquely capable of harmonizing this entire 
constellation of doctrines while explaining the legally obligatory 
force of contracts,230 it has major interpretive advantages over all 
other leading theories of contract. 
With respect to completeness, I have also shown that con-
tract as empowerment can explain core doctrines at each major 
stage of contract analysis: formation (for example, the rules of 
mutual assent and consideration);231 interpretation and con-
struction (for example, the modified objective approach to inter-
pretation and the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing);232 
performance and breach (for example, the standard rules gov-
erning tests for material breach and the reactions warranted by 
different classes of breach);233 many of the standard defenses (for 
example, unconscionability and public policy); and the standard 
remedies (for example, private rights to expectation damages, 
with some exceptions for specific performance).234 Contract as 
empowerment also explains why claims for breach of contract 
differ from claims for promissory estoppel.235 
Although more work remains to be done, contract as em-
powerment thus identifies a unifying thread that runs through 
many varied contract-law doctrines and helps to distinguish its 
core subject matter. For reasons discussed, contract as empow-
erment also offers the best available general interpretation of 
this doctrinal core. Hence, at the very least, it will be worth the 
time and effort to extend contract as empowerment to a much 
broader range of doctrines. One of the central purposes of this 
Article is, in fact, to introduce contract as empowerment in a 
succinct and compelling enough manner to prompt those further 
applications. I hope to encourage empowerment-based accounts 
of a much broader range of doctrines and establish the need for 
empowerment-based recommendations with respect to more le-
gal reforms. 
 
 229 See Part II. 
 230 See Parts I, III. 
 231 See Parts III.B, III.C.1. 
 232 See Part III.C.2. 
 233 See Part III.C.2. 
 234 See Part III.A. 
 235 See Part III.B. 
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B. Distinctiveness of the Theory from Economic Accounts 
The second objection argues that even if contract as empow-
erment offers a complete interpretive theory, it is insufficiently 
distinct from economic theories to offer a meaningful alterna-
tive. This objection is rooted in the fact that contract as empow-
erment relies on some economic insights to ground some recom-
mendations that resemble those of economic theories.236 
When determining which contract rules should be legally 
enforced, contract as empowerment does, in fact, resemble eco-
nomic theories in some ways. Unlike many traditional deonto-
logical (or duty-based) theories, it explicitly considers the conse-
quences of legal rules when determining the appropriate shape 
of contract law.237 Contract as empowerment can therefore ab-
sorb many of the economic and psychological insights that have 
given economic theories their traditional explanatory ad-
vantages.238 Still, contract as empowerment considers these con-
sequences from a special perspective, which prevents the theory 
from being reduced to a purely consequentialist one.239 Rather 
than asking which rules produce the best economic consequenc-
es without more, it asks whether certain rules, with certain ex-
pected consequences, are ones that no one could reasonably re-
ject in light of the available alternatives.240 This form of 
justification is fundamentally contractualist, not consequential-
ist, in orientation. It is a deontological (or duty-based) form of 
justification, which can sometimes—as shown in earlier sec-
tions—produce different recommendations than economic theo-
ries produce.241 
In addition, even when contract as empowerment generates 
the same recommendations as economic theories, it offers a fun-
damentally different interpretation of them. This difference is 
 
 236 See Part I.  
 237 Contractualists agree that “[c]laims about individual well-being are one class of 
valid starting points for moral argument.” Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism 
at 108 (cited in note 32).  
 238 See, for example, Part III.A.2 (absorbing but reinterpreting some insights of effi-
cient breach theorists); Parts I, III.C.1 (absorbing but reinterpreting some insights about 
the welfare-producing aspects of contract law and modern markets). 
 239 See generally, for example, Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism (cited in 
note 32). 
 240 See id at 110 (“An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would 
be disallowed by any system of rules for the general regulation of behaviour which no 
one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.”).  
 241 See, for example, Part III. 
 826  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:759 
   
equally important for understanding the use and distinctiveness 
of the current theory. 
To illustrate, consider the fact that both contract as empow-
erment and economic theories endorse a major role for private 
negotiation, pursued from a standpoint of self-interest, in gener-
ating legally enforceable contracts.242 Both cite similar facts for 
this endorsement. When, for example, private parties bargain 
from a perspective of self-interest, their voluntary choices tend 
to reveal their subjective preferences.243 Contract enforcement 
can therefore promote exchanges that conduce to both parties’ 
subjective preferences.244 Although I do not believe that subjective-
preference satisfaction equates to human welfare,245 I do believe 
that people are different enough to have varied personal sources 
of happiness and welfare. I also believe that peoples’ subjective 
preferences often provide useful—though not infallible—sources 
of information about their routes to personal happiness and wel-
fare.246 I believe, finally, that Professor Hayek was right to point 
 
 242 See Part III. 
 243 For the source of this highly influential “revealed preference” approach to meas-
uring utility, see generally Samuelson, 5 Economica 61 (cited in note 150). Although 
some economists have criticized the idea that preferences can be identified simply from 
choice, there is no doubt that choosing something over other available options increases 
the likelihood of the chosen good being subjectively preferred to the other options. See 
generally, for example, Sen, 61 Econometrica 495 (cited in note 150). 
 244 See, for example, Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic 
Relations under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw U L Rev 
854, 872 (1978) (“When A and B agree to exchange A’s good X in return for B’s good Y, we 
conclude, in the absence of factors other than desires for X and Y causing the agreement 
to occur, that the exchange will enhance the utility levels of each.”); id (“[T]he underlying 
assumption [is] that the function of a classical or neoclassical contract law system is to 
enhance the utilities created by choice-generated exchange.”). 
 245 For a good discussion of some of the problems with defining human welfare in 
terms of revealed subjective preferences, see Robert Sugden, Book Review, Welfare, Re-
sources, and Capabilities: A Review of Inequality Reexamined by Amartya Sen, 31 J Econ 
Lit 1947, 1957–62 (1993). 
 246 Some scholars, including Mill, have posited psychological mechanisms that shape 
our complex desires over the course of our experiences to better track our happiness. See, 
for example, John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Liber-
ty, and Representative Government 1, 46 (Dutton 1951): 
Life would be a poor thing, very ill provided with sources of happiness, if there 
were not this provision of nature, by which things originally indifferent, but 
conducive to, or otherwise associated with, the satisfaction of our primitive de-
sires, become in themselves sources of pleasure more valuable than the primi-
tive pleasures, both in permanency, in the space of human existence that they 
are capable of covering, and even in intensity.  
I believe that these types of mechanisms plausibly exist as evolutionary adaptations but 
that they are also prone to failure in some circumstances. There are also circumstances 
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out that private bargaining produces information about the 
routes to human preference satisfaction that is often very diffi-
cult—if not impossible—for a centralized state planner to identi-
fy on its own.247 Hence, I believe that contract law provides an 
especially useful and nonduplicative mechanism for private par-
ties to meet a broad range of human needs and interests 
through the marketplace. 
These are reasons that many economists cite to explain the 
legal enforcement of contracts, and these are reasons that empow-
erment theorists can endorse.248 Still, contract as empowerment 
interprets self-interested bargaining very differently than classi-
cal economic theories do. Instead of suggesting that people are 
purely instrumentally rational (or even boundedly rational249), 
contract as empowerment recognizes that most people have ad-
ditional moral motivations. Based on a range of theoretical, evo-
lutionary, and empirical work, it suggests that most humans 
have a natural sense of obligation,250 which it interprets to in-
clude motives to act in ways that people can justify to others on 
grounds that others cannot reasonably reject.251 On the current 
view, people need not dispense with these motives when they 
enter the marketplace. They can bargain with one another from 
a perspective of self-interest and still treat each other as full 
moral equals, so long as this form of bargaining is either permitted 
 
in which true happiness requires freedom from the bondage of self. See Kar, 84 Tex L 
Rev at 927 (cited in note 12). 
 247 See Hayek, 35 Am Econ Rev at 524 (cited in note 97); Macneil, 72 Nw U L Rev at 
859 (cited in note 244) (“The combination of exchange with promise has been one of the 
most powerful social tools ever developed for the production of goods and services.”). 
 248 See, for example, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 123–26 (cited in note 188) 
(discussing the economic functions of contracts, particularly with respect to consideration). 
 249 See generally, for example, Tversky and Kahneman, 211 Science 453 (cited in 
note 31) (describing classical assumptions of rationality in economic theory and recom-
mending their replacement with a theory of bounded rationality); Daniel Kahneman, A 
Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality, 58 Am Psychologist 
697 (2003) (suggesting the replacement of classical rational-choice theory with a theory 
of bounded rationality in the social sciences). 
 250 See generally Kar, 84 Tex L Rev 877 (cited in note 12). See also Jonathan Haidt, 
The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion 25–26 (Allen 
Lane 2012) (supplementing the two main theories from whence “morality comes”—
innateness and childhood learning—with a third theory that “morality is self-constructed 
by children on the basis of their experiences with harm”); Mikhail, Elements of Moral 
Cognition at 296–97 (cited in note 29) (noting that classical natural lawyers like Cicero 
and Hume believed that our “moral sense” is innate to our human nature). 
 251 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other at 191 (cited in note 27) (suggesting that 
ordinary people are motivated to act not only rationally but also in ways that they can 
justify to others as conforming to principles for the general regulation of behavior that 
others, similarly motivated, cannot reasonably reject). 
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or encouraged by rules that no one could reasonably reject. Con-
tract as empowerment suggests that bargaining from a perspec-
tive of self-interest is permitted (within limits) in the marketplace 
but construes these bargains as generating genuine legal obliga-
tions, which engage more than just contracting parties’ capaci-
ties for instrumental reason. 
On the current view, contracting and modern market activi-
ty are therefore not simply social spheres in which self-interest 
runs wild. Nor are they spheres in which competition of every 
kind is permitted. They are rule-governed social phenomena, 
which generate genuine legal obligations to the precise extent 
that the rules are simultaneously empowering and reflective of a 
moral ideal of equal respect for persons. It follows that persons 
who interact with each other in accordance with rules like these 
participate in a form of moral, and not just economic, interac-
tion. They treat one another as full moral equals—and not as 
mere means to economic goals or private ends. 
Contract as empowerment can therefore absorb many eco-
nomic insights and endorse many similar rules,252 but it still of-
fers a meaningful alternative to economic theories.253 It suggests 
that an important moral fiber has been running through con-
tract law and modern markets for some time now—albeit one 
that has often been obscured by classical economic interpreta-
tions of these phenomena. This moral fiber must be understood 
in any true social science of contract law and modern markets.  
C. Controversial Normative Foundations of the Theory 
The third objection to contract as empowerment challenges 
the theory because it rests on a controversial normative founda-
tion. Every normative theory faces this challenge in some form. 
Still, I believe that the normative foundations of contract as em-
powerment are less problematic, in this particular context, than 
other normative theories of contract for three reasons. 
First, for reasons explained herein, I believe that contract as 
empowerment offers the most promising general interpretation of 
contract law’s doctrinal core.254 To the extent that this is true, it 
articulates the best available justification of the core of modern 
contract law as it stands. Even if one questions the normative 
 
 252 See, for example, Parts I, III.A.2, III.B. 
 253 See, for example, Parts III.A.2, III.C. 
 254 See Part III. 
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foundations of contract law, the theory thus tells us something 
important about what those normative foundations are. They 
are not purely consequentialist in nature. 
Second, this may be the best we can hope for with respect to 
justifying human constructions like the common law of con-
tracts. In The Two Faces of Morality, I outline several highly 
general constraints that any form of justification must meet to 
qualify a rule as a moral (and not merely a prudential) rule.255 I 
concede that both utilitarian and contractualist forms of justifi-
cation meet these very general constraints and suggest that 
there may be no further fact of the matter as to which form of 
justification is more valid.256 Humans nevertheless appear to 
have naturally evolved to engage in a particular species of moral 
judgment, which happens to be contractualist in form and tends 
to produce a recognizable species of moral life and interaction.257 
Unless there is some further fact of the matter as to what moral-
ity really is, which conclusively disproves contractualist ac-
counts of the right, it may be justification for us enough to show 
that contract law reflects a human species of moral interaction. 
Third, in any event, I believe that contractualist accounts of 
obligation are the right ones to apply to the law. Although it 
goes beyond the scope of this Article to argue this here, contrac-
tualist accounts have an incredibly solid pedigree. They reflect 
one of the two major branches of social contract theory, and 
some of the most prominent moral and political philosophers of 
our time—including Professors Stephen Darwall, Christine 
Korsgaard, John Rawls, and Thomas Scanlon—have argued for 
their validity.258 In Contractualism and Utilitarianism, Scanlon 
explains why contractualist accounts better capture the intui-
tions about morality that lead many to feel forced to accept utili-
tarian accounts of the right.259 I believe that Scanlon’s argu-
ments on this point are correct—at least when it comes to the 
realm of what we owe to one another. 
There are, moreover, heightened reasons to think that con-
tractualist approaches to justification apply to legal obligations. 
 
 255 See Kar, The Two Faces of Morality at 68–69 (cited in note 29). 
 256 Id at 69. 
 257 See, for example, Kar, 84 Tex L Rev at 877 (cited in note 12); Brian Skyrms, Evo-
lution of the Social Contract 4–7 (Cambridge 1996). See also generally Kar, The Psycho-
logical Foundations of Human Rights (cited in note 29). 
 258 For a general account of these varied views, see generally Darwall, Contractarianism/ 
Contractualism (cited in note 26).  
 259 See generally Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism (cited in note 32). 
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This is because legal obligations purport to give some other person 
or group the authority to demand compliance. Legal obligations 
are therefore instances of what Darwall calls “second-personal 
reasons.”260 In Hart’s Response to Exclusive Legal Positivism, I 
argue at length that the law is fundamentally second personal in 
nature and that Hart was beginning to understand that fact 
himself toward the end of his career.261 This is true even if—
contrary to Darwall—some aspects of interpersonal morality are 
not fundamentally second personal in nature.262 But I also accept 
Darwall’s arguments that second-personal reasons can have the 
authority that they purport to have only if they are justifiable in 
contractualist terms.263 This is because they involve interperson-
al demands, which are backed by the threat of formal or infor-
mal sanctions. These demands and sanctions can amount to 
something more than coercion only if the rules that give rise to 
them are justifiable to their addressees in terms that these ad-
dressees cannot personally reasonably reject.264 It follows that 
contractualist forms of justification are particularly relevant to 
justifying legal obligations. 
 
 260 Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint at 8 (cited in note 22):  
A second-personal reason is one whose validity depends on presupposed au-
thority and accountability relations between persons and, therefore, on the 
possibility of the  reason’s being addressed person-to-person. Reasons addressed 
or presupposed in orders, requests, claims, reproaches, complaints, demands, 
promises, contracts, givings of consent, commands, and so on are all second-
personal in this sense.  
 261 See generally Kar, 95 Georgetown L J 393 (cited in note 33). 
 262 Some have argued against Darwall’s second-personal interpretation of morality. 
See, for example, Christine M. Korsgaard, Autonomy and the Second Person Within: A 
Commentary on Stephen Darwall’s The Second-Person Standpoint, 118 Ethics 8, 20–23 
(2007) (arguing that Darwall’s main normative conclusions follow from a first person 
stance on deliberation); R. Jay Wallace, Reasons, Relations, and Commands: Reflections 
on Darwall, 118 Ethics 24, 26–27 (2007) (arguing that some moral requirements do not 
depend on being addressed in a second-personal manner); Gary Watson, Morality as 
Equal Accountability: Comments on Stephen Darwall’s The Second-Person Standpoint, 
118 Ethics 37, 50–51 (2007) (arguing that Darwall’s arguments rely on a limited rejec-
tion of certain nonconstructivist forms of moral realism). But see generally Stephen 
Darwall, Reply to Korsgaard, Wallace, and Watson, 118 Ethics 52 (2007). I take no posi-
tion on these issues here, but I would like to make two observations. First, some of these 
arguments, like Korsgaard’s, imply that there is a first personal source for a similar con-
tractualist approach to morality—thus providing an argument of the wrong kind to un-
dermine the current project. Second, some of the other arguments, like Wallace’s, apply 
to some aspects of morality but not to law, whereas others, like Watson’s, rely on the 
possibility of a nonconstructivist form of moral realism—which many reject.  
 263 See Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint at 29–38, 300–20 (cited in note 22). 
 264 See id at 300–20.  
 2016] Contract as Empowerment 831 
 
In sum, the normative foundations of contract as empower-
ment are—at minimum—no more controversial than those of 
any other theory. They provide the best harmonized justification 
for the core of contract law as it currently stands, in part be-
cause they explain the legally obligatory aspects of contract law 
in ways that economic theories cannot. There are also good rea-
sons to think that contractualist accounts of obligation are cor-
rect, especially as accounts of legal obligation. But there may be 
no fact of the matter as to whether contractualist or consequen-
tialist theories of the right are true. In that case, contractualist 
accounts describe the species of moral action that comes most 
naturally to us. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have introduced the basic theory of contract 
as empowerment and argued that it has major interpretive ad-
vantages over both orthodox economic and philosophical theo-
ries. The theory is simultaneously descriptive, in that it explains 
the shape of many of contract law’s core doctrines, and norma-
tive, in that it explains how contract law should look if it is to 
give rise to genuine legal obligations. By harmonizing a core 
constellation of doctrines, which would otherwise pose a power-
ful challenge to modern contract theory, I have argued that con-
tract as empowerment offers the best available interpretation of 
contract law’s doctrinal core—at least in relation to the common 
law. Contract as empowerment may therefore offer the missing 
theory of contract described by Professors Schwartz and Scott.265 
Several important consequences follow. First, I believe that 
contract as empowerment tells us something important, and po-
tentially surprising, about contracts and modern markets. Con-
tracting is first and foremost a rule-governed social activity.266 
The rules that govern contract are complex and interlocking,267 
and any social scientists or philosophers interested in under-
standing them should therefore begin by seeking the best inter-
pretation of this entire body of rules. Although economics aspires 
to be a social science,268 economists sometimes bring a range of 
theoretical preconceptions to their studies that can distort their 
 
 265 Schwartz and Scott, 113 Yale L J at 543 (cited in note 1). 
 266 See Part I.  
 267 See Parts II, III. 
 268 See generally Daniel M. Hausman, Introduction, in Daniel M. Hausman, ed, The 
Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology 1 (Cambridge 3d ed 2008). 
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understandings of these phenomena.269 On the best interpreta-
tion, contracts and modern market activity do not appear to re-
flect rules that merely aim to promote efficiency.270 They are bet-
ter interpreted as rule-governed spheres of moral interaction, 
which produce genuine legal obligations to the precise extent 
that the rules are simultaneously empowering and reflective of a 
moral ideal of equal respect for persons. This is what contract 
law is—though we have thus far only dimly perceived it as such. 
Second, contract as empowerment offers a distinctive 
framework for legal reform. It suggests that contract law should 
often be finely tuned to be more equally empowering to all—
because this rationale is normatively satisfying in its own right, 
because this sort of justification is typically needed for contracts 
to produce genuine legal obligations, and because empowerment 
principles better reflect the basic principles that have animated 
contract law and modern markets for some time now. Contract 
as empowerment suggests that many commonly perceived ten-
sions within contract law—such as the tensions among fairness, 
liberty, and efficiency—are not always real.271 If crafted properly, 
rules that promote all of these values can work together so that 
each plays a distinctive but appropriate role in promoting the 
fundamental principles of contract. 
In my view, the places in which theoretical misinterpreta-
tions of contract have proved most damaging relate to doctrines 
 
 269 As Professor Daniel Hausman has said:  
[E]conomics is a peculiar science. Many of its premises are platitudes such as 
“Individuals can rank alternatives” or “Individuals choose what they most pre-
fer.” Other premises are simplifications such as “Commodities are infinitely di-
visible,” or “Individuals have perfect information.” On such platitudes and 
simplifications, . . . economists have erected a mathematically sophisticated 
theoretical edifice, whose conclusions, although certainly not “necessarily erro-
neous,” are nevertheless often off the mark.  
Id at 1. I should also note that I draw a distinction between theoretical assumptions that 
are simplifying but illuminating and ones that are distorting. I count some classical eco-
nomic approaches to contract law in the latter category because—as I have argued in 
this Article—they fail to account for central, pervasive, highly stable, and defining fea-
tures of contract law. See Part IV.B. In my view, classical and neoclassical approaches to 
economics therefore fail to comprehend important aspects of their own subject matter. I 
nevertheless accept that some other aspects of economic theory are simplifying but illu-
minating. In those cases, I have tried to absorb the relevant insights into the current 
theory. 
 270 For a classic discussion, see Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 343 (cited in 
note 188) (“On occasion, common law courts flinch from the full embrace of the implica-
tions of that theory. . . . Efficiency or wealth maximization is an important thread in the 
ethical tapestry, but it is not the only one.”). 
 271 See Parts II, III. 
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that invite or require courts to police bargains for substantive 
fairness. Debates about these doctrines have become so highly 
polarized and ideological in the United States that impartial as-
sessment has become a near-dead commodity.272 One reason for 
this is that many people view market regulations as inherently 
inimical to the principles that animate modern market activi-
ty.273 Another is the incredibly long hand of the Cold War, which 
has left us with outmoded ways of framing some of our most im-
portant debates about how markets operate and the appropriate 
role of markets in contemporary society.274 Our current choices 
are not, however, just socialism, which in its most austere form 
is now dead,275 or pure laissez-faire capitalism, which has never 
existed;276 nor is the best question how to blend two seemingly 
incompatible systems.277 It is time to dispense with these outdat-
ed ways of framing the debate over contract law and market 
regulations278 so that we can identify the true principles that 
unify contract law and make modern markets work.  
 
 272 For excellent discussions of how the moral psychology of ideological debate colors 
even some purely factual disputes, see Haidt, The Righteous Mind at 41–44 (cited in note 
250). See also generally Dan M. Kahan, et al, “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberal-
ism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 Stan L Rev 851 (2012). 
 273 See, for example, Craswell, Freedom of Contract at 81 (cited in note 216) (“De-
pending on one’s point of view, freedom of contract can be seen as a choice between indi-
vidual liberty and heavy-handed government control, or between communitarian consen-
sus and the worst excesses of laissez-faire capitalism.”). 
 274 For an excellent discussion of the Cold War, see Anderson, Toward a Post Cold-
War Political Economy (cited in note 63). 
 275 See Seweryn Bialer, Is Socialism Dead?, in Robert Jervis and Seweryn Bialer, 
eds, Soviet-American Relations after the Cold War 98, 98 (Duke 1991) (“By now it is quite 
certain that Marxian socialism in its most politically meaningful twentieth-century vari-
ant, radical Leninism, is dead as a state ideology.”). 
 276 See Anderson, Toward a Post Cold-War Political Economy (cited in note 63) 
(“There are many difficulties with this way of classifying economic alternatives. For one, 
the extremes on both left and right are no longer credible options, if they ever were.”). 
 277 See id (“[I]t doesn’t make much sense to represent the economies of Western Europe 
and North America as ‘mixtures’ of two deeply incompatible and doomed systems.”). 
 278 For a related point, see id: 
It’s time we got rid of the contemporary conceptual analogue to “mixed gov-
ernment”—namely, the idea of a “mixed economy.” We still tend to think that 
the economies of the advanced democracies in North America and Europe are 
“mixed” in some kind of combination of laissez-faire capitalism and socialism. 
The idea got a lot of traction from the seeming viability of communism as an 
alternative mode of organizing an economy, plus a mythology of capitalism as 
at its most pure in its laissez-faire version. It turned out [that] both the (far) 
left and the right had an interest in representing “true” capitalism as laissez-
faire capitalism—the former, to stress the ill fates of those who get chewed up 
in a dog-eat-dog economy, the latter, to celebrate the freedom to be top dog in 
such a system. 
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I believe that these principles relate to empowerment. For 
reasons discussed, contract as empowerment also offers a dis-
tinctive framework for determining when market regulations 
promote the fundamental principles of contract and modern 
market economies rather than reflect alien intrusions into the 
marketplace. The present theory can therefore be extended to 
address a range of currently heated debates about the appropri-
ate role of market regulations in many different markets—from 
those in consumer goods to those in labor, finance, credit, mort-
gages, and many others. By introducing contract as empower-
ment into contemporary debates over how best to interpret con-
tract law, I hope to encourage empowerment-based approaches 
to more questions like these. 
 
Although Professor Elizabeth Anderson has thought deeply about the implications of 
such a move for understanding systems of tax and transfer, the current Article engages 
in an analogous exercise with respect to contract law. 
